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SHOULD THE RULES COMMITTEES HAVE AN AMICUS ROLE?
Scott Dodson*
Despite its formal status as promulgator of federal-court rules of
practice and procedure, the Supreme Court is a suboptimal rule
interpreter, as recent groundbreaking but flawed rules decisions
illustrate. Scholars have proposed abstention mechanisms to constrain
the Court in certain rule-interpretation contexts, but these
mechanisms disable the Court from performing its core adjudicatory
functions of dispute resolution and law interpretation. This Article
urges a different solution: bring the rulemakers to the Court. It argues
that the Rules Committees—those bodies primarily responsible for
studying the rules and drafting rule amendments—should take up a
modest amicus practice in rules cases to offer the Court information
that may improve its decision making in rules cases. The Article
explores the possible forms of such a role and articulates guiding
norms for its structure, timing, and content.
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INTRODUCTION
HE Supreme Court is experiencing a “procedure revival,”1 deciding
more cases involving certain federal rules than in previous eras.2
The cases often result in controversial interpretations of court rules that
are critical to litigation, from pleading standards to class-certification

T

1
Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure Revival, 31 Rev.
Litig. 313, 314 (2012).
2
Elizabeth G. Porter, Pragmatism Rules, 101 Cornell L. Rev. 123, 124 (2015) (“[T]he
Roberts Court has decided more cases involving the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in ten
years than the Rehnquist Court did in twice that time.”). Some members of the Court may be
pressing the revival more than others. Compare Scott Dodson, A Revolution in Jurisdiction,
in The Legacy of Ruth Bader Ginsburg 137, 137–39 (Scott Dodson ed. 2015) (highlighting
Justice Ginsburg’s role in advancing jurisdictional doctrine), with Scott Dodson, Justice
Souter and the Civil Rules, 88 Wash. U. L. Rev. 289, 289–90 (2010) (noting the infrequency
of Justice Souter’s opinions in civil-procedure cases).
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standards to the validity of the rules themselves.3 These interpretations
have wide-ranging effects because the Court’s pronouncements affect
the scope and application of rules ubiquitously at stake in the lower
courts.4 It is unsurprising that the Supreme Court’s most famous ruleinterpretation opinions dominate the list of most-cited opinions.5
The importance of the Court’s turn to procedure has prompted
scholars to question the interpretive norms the Court uses—or should
use—when it approaches rules cases.6 Because rule interpretation lacks
the separation-of-powers backdrop of statutory interpretation, scholars
have pressed for an independent normative foundation for rule
interpretation that focuses on rule-of-law, legitimacy, and accuracy
values.7
Animating the normative conversation is a recognition that the
Supreme Court is, in some ways, less equipped to make ruleinterpretation pronouncements than the rulemaking bodies themselves.
Relying on analogies to administrative law, scholars have offered Courtside solutions for shifting interpretive authority away from the Supreme
Court and toward rulemakers or lower-court judges. These proposals
range from encouraging the Court to abstain and remand certain ruleapplication questions8 to creating a referencing procedure for
reallocating certain rule-interpretation questions from the Court to the

3

See Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (class-certification standards under
Rule 23); Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010)
(validity of Rule 23); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standards under Rule
8); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading standards under Rule 8).
4
See Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, Civil Rules Interpretive Theory, 101 Minn.
L. Rev. 2167, 2170 (2017) (“[F]ederal courts must interpret the Rules in literally every civil
case . . . .”).
5
See Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1293, 1357 tbl.1 (2010)
(ranking opinions).
6
See Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 4, at 2170–73 (contrasting different cases);
Porter, supra note 2, at 125 (critiquing the interpretative methodologies the Roberts Court
has used in rules decisions).
7
See Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 4, at 2173 (“[W]e turn to first principles and
provide a comprehensive argument for the position that the Rules demand a distinctive
theory of interpretation.”).
8
See Porter, supra note 2, at 130.
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Rules Committees—the bodies primarily responsible for studying the
rules and drafting amendments to them.9
These Court-side proposals offer useful insights, especially in their
focus on institutional capacity and judicial modesty. But they also
encounter structural difficulties and risk marginalization of the
adjudicatory functions of the Court. Any abstention or referral process
delays authoritative adjudication of the dispute, costing the parties time
and wasted effort and denying the public and future litigants an
immediate answer on important procedural questions. The decisional
process for determining which cases or issues should or should not be
decided by the Court itself can be difficult and contentious.10 Further, if
the parties know or suspect that the Court is likely to refuse to decide the
issue, they will not seek the Court’s review in the first place, which
ultimately will render the lower courts the primary—and fragmented—
judicial authority on some important questions of rule interpretation and
application.11 Finally, the Rules Committees sometimes draft rules
without specific applications or interpretations in mind, preferring to
9
See Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, The Supreme Court’s Regulation of Civil
Procedure: Lessons from Administrative Law, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1188, 1236–40 (2012); see
also Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 4, at 2174 (revising the proposed referencing
procedure). I use the term “Rules Committees” to refer to the Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure (colloquially called the “Standing Committee”) plus the five areaspecific Advisory Committees primarily responsible for amendment proposals. See
Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedure Chairs and Reporters, U.S. Courts (Oct. 25,
2016),
http://www.uscourts.gov/file/committee-rules-practice-and-procedure-chairs-andreporters [https://perma.cc/2TM7-YBB2].
10
See Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, Institutional Competence and Civil Rules
Interpretation, 101 Cornell L. Rev. Online 64, 67, 69–70 (2016) (distinguishing between
“policy-change” and “equity” cases); Porter, supra note 2, at 177–78 (distinguishing between
“managerial” and “interpretation” cases). Mulligan, Staszewski, and Porter all seem to
acknowledge that neat categories belie the reality that cases fall along a continuum, see
Mulligan & Staszewski, supra, at 70 n.34, and Porter, supra note 2, at 135–36, but they seem
to disagree about how to classify the most critical cases, such as Twombly and Dukes, see
Mulligan & Staszewski, supra, at 73.
11
By way of analogy, in 2015, Dow Chemical petitioned for certiorari to resolve a
pervasive circuit split on whether Rule 23 requires proof of class-wide injury. See Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari at 15–18, Dow Chem. Co. v. Indus. Polymers, 137 S. Ct. 291 (2016)
(No. 14-1091). But in the midst of briefing, Justice Scalia unexpectedly died, likely leaving
the Court split 4-4 on the issue and unable to muster a controlling opinion. Rather than
proceed under these circumstances, Dow settled, resulting in dismissal of the petition, see
Dow Chem. Co., 137 S. Ct. 291, and leaving the lower courts as the primary but fragmented
authority on the question.
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have the Supreme Court gloss the rules through judicial interpretation,
and it is unclear how abstention or referral would bridge that gap.12
Given these difficulties, I propose a different path. Instead of urging
the Court to abdicate its adjudicative responsibility, I suggest improving
the Court’s adjudicative capacity by bringing the rulemakers to the aid
of the Court. In short, I propose giving the Rules Committees a voice in
cases before the Court.
Rules Committee participation in adjudication could take a number of
forms.13 The most promising and least disruptive form would give the
Rules Committees a role in amicus practice. This role would allow the
rulemaking bodies to present to the Court information often necessary
for effective rule interpretation—underlying rule policy, rulemaker
intent, rule interrelatedness, empirical data, and the like—without
disrupting the Court’s existing adjudicative processes. The practice
would be meant to improve, rather than disrupt, the Court’s adjudicative
and decision-making processes.
My proposal would, however, disrupt existing amicus practice
because, at present, the Rules Committees have no involvement in
amicus practice at all. The two main reasons for this noninvolvement are
that the Rules Committees purposefully refrain from involvement in
adjudications and that the Solicitor General normally represents the
interests of the United States before the Supreme Court. Giving the
12

I discuss this in more detail in text accompanying notes 258–59.
The most radical form would give the Rules Committees a formal but separate decisionmaking role in resolving disputes through the rendition of advisory opinions at the insistence
of potential or existing litigants. The Judicial Conference has authorized its Committee on
Codes and Conduct to issue advisory opinions regarding judicial ethics rules. Published
Advisory Opinions, Judicial Conference of the U.S. (April 6, 2017),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/judiciary-policies/code-conduct/published-advisoryopinions [https://perma.cc/5HFF-U7EW]. Interestingly, the Federal Judicial Center has
suggested extending a similar authority to the Rules Committees, see Winifred R. Brown,
Federal Rulemaking: Problems and Possibilities 131–32 (1981), http://www2.fjc.gov/sites/
default/files/2012/FdRlmkng.pdf, and there are reports (though I cannot find documentation)
that the Standing Committee considered creating such a procedure in the 1990s during its
long-range plan project but ultimately declined to do so. See Telephone Interview with John
Rabiej, Former Chief of the Support Office, Judicial Conference Comm. on the Rules of
Practice & Procedure (Dec. 28, 2016). Advisory opinions at the insistence of potential
disputants, however, present acute structural, logistical, and constitutional difficulties, as
well as concerns about the relative institutional capacity of the rulemakers for case
adjudication, see Porter, supra note 2, at 154–56, 183–84, all of which my more modest
proposal for amicus participation avoids.
13
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Rules Committees a role would therefore require reconsideration of
amicus norms.
I urge reconsideration of those norms. The Rules Committees have
useful information to impart to the Court’s consideration of rules cases,
and the Court’s business suffers without it. The Office of the Solicitor
General, when it participates as amicus in rule-interpretation cases, often
lacks this information. Further, the Solicitor General cannot adequately
represent the interests and policies underlying the rules because its
advocacy must—and should—represent a number of other interests,
including the policy preferences of the President, the efficacy of the
executive branch, and the interests of the government as a litigant. In the
midst of these interests, the interests of the judiciary in the fair and
effective functioning of the procedural rules do not receive full attention.
This Article thus reconsiders those amicus norms and argues for
giving the Rules Committees an amicus role in rule cases. That role
could take different forms. The weakest form would give the Rules
Committees a collaborative role in filings by the Solicitor General by
normalizing a practice of having the Solicitor General seek and consider
input provided by the Rules Committees. The strongest form would give
the Rules Committees independent authority to file amicus briefs.
Hybrid forms would normalize consultation but also grant independent
amicus authority in specified circumstances, such as if the Solicitor
General refused to file an amicus brief or had a conflict of interest.
The Article defends this amicus proposal in three parts. Part I sets the
stage by articulating the need for rulemaker input in rule-interpretation
cases before the Supreme Court. It details the rulemaking process,
contrasts the relative institutional capacities of the Supreme Court and
the rulemaking bodies, and highlights the separation between rulemakers
and the Court. Using two case studies, this Part exposes the harms of
forcing the Court to adjudicate rule-interpretation cases without
rulemaker input.
Part II then defends the proposal to grant the Rules Committees an
amicus role as a mechanism for supplying rulemaking information to the
Court. It details the different forms this role could take and considers
what limits should attend to the role. This Part also considers the
mechanics of Committee amicus practice and suggests that
responsibility for amicus content and drafting be located in the
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Administrative Office’s Office of General Counsel, which is staffed by
career attorneys who already provide support to the Rules Committees.
Part III then addresses some objections to my proposal, including the
objections that existing amicus practice is adequate, that my proposal is
too disruptive to the Rules Committees, that the proposal magnifies
political slants or other biases, and that other obstacles are
insurmountable. I explain why these objections are misplaced or
unavailing and conclude that the Rules Committees should play an
amicus role in certain rules cases before the Supreme Court.
I. THE SEPARATION BETWEEN RULEMAKERS AND THE COURT
The Rules Enabling Act delegates rulemaking authority to the
Supreme Court but allocates drafting responsibility to Rules
Committees. In modern practice, the Rules Committees are the rule
experts, and the Supreme Court largely stays out of the rulemaking
process, with the exception of exercising final approval. Upon
promulgation, the Rules Committees’ work is finished. The task of
interpreting the rules then falls to the Court, and the Rules Committees
largely refrain from involvement in the Court’s adjudicatory process.
This separation, especially at the adjudicative stage, impoverishes Court
decision making.
A. The Rulemaking Separation
In 1934, Congress passed the Rules Enabling Act, which delegated to
the Supreme Court the power to promulgate “rules of practice and
procedure.”14 The Court, on its own initiative, promptly created and
outsourced the drafting function of civil rules to an Advisory Committee
whose members were appointed by the Court as a whole.15
For the first few decades of civil rulemaking under the Act, the
Advisory Committee was dominated by academics and prominent

14

Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–
2077 (2012)). For the definitive history of the Act, see Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules
Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1015 (1982).
15
Order, Appointment of the Committee to Draft Unified System of Equity and Law
Rules, 295 U.S. 774 (1935).
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practitioners rather than sitting federal judges.16 Meetings were closed to
the public, and discourse was vigorous but insular. In 1958, Congress
directed the Judicial Conference to “carry on a continuous study of the
operation and effect” of the rules and to recommend changes,17 and the
Judicial Conference then delegated primary drafting responsibility to the
Standing and Advisory Committees.18 During this time, the Supreme
Court generally deferred to the civil rules Advisory Committee but
sometimes revised rules on its own.19 Meanwhile, Congress rarely
intervened to prevent a rule from taking effect.
Things changed in the 1970s, when Congress began a two-decade
span of rulemaking engagement and reform.20 Congress rejected the
proposed Federal Rules of Evidence,21 and critics of the cloistered and
facile rulemaking process urged more transparency, public participation,
and levels of review.22 In 1988, Congress amended the Rules Enabling
Act to open any Committee business to the public, require the
appointment of a Standing Committee, provide that any Advisory
Committees be composed of members of the bench and bar, and direct
that any rulemaking recommendation be accompanied by an explanatory
note of the rule and a written report explaining the decisions and any
dissenting views.23
Rulemaking today displays several important features. First, the
composition of Rules Committee membership, over which the Judicial

16
Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1099, 1109 n.24 (2002).
17
Pub. L. No. 85-513, 72 Stat. 356 (1958) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 331).
18
See Struve, supra note 16, at 1107.
19
Id. at 1106 n.11. Once, the Court revised a rule of criminal procedure unilaterally,
without any Advisory Committee involvement. See Charles E. Clark, The Role of the
Supreme Court in Federal Rule-Making, 46 J. Am. Judicature Soc’y 250, 257 (1963).
20
David Marcus, Institutions and an Interpretive Methodology for the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 2011 Utah L. Rev. 927, 946–47. For a critique of the rulemaking process,
see Jack B. Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 Colum. L. Rev.
905, 936 (1976).
21
Struve, supra note 16, at 1107 n.16.
22
See id. at 1107–08.
23
Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702 § 401, 102 Stat.
4642, 4649 (1988) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (2012)).
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Conference rules grant the Chief Justice the sole appointment power,24
has become dominated by judges. The Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules now has seven district judges, one appellate judge, one state
judge, four practitioners, one representative from the Department of
Justice, one academic, and two nonvoting academic reporters.25 Second,
the more open process has shifted the rulemaking focus away from an
academic enterprise and toward a more democratic process characterized
by caution, accommodation, compromise, and, at times, capitulation.26
This shift in process has affected the substance of rule proposals27 and
has caused some to worry about undue interest-group influence on the
rulemaking process.28 Third, the insertion of additional layers and
approval processes has slowed—perhaps even has ossified—
rulemaking.29
At the same time, the Supreme Court has become less involved in the
rulemaking process. Before 1988, the Court occasionally rejected rules
proposed by the Advisory Committee and occasionally promulgated its
own rules without the aid of the Advisory Committee.30 Today,
rulemaking’s additional layers, public-participation vetting process, and
24

About the Judicial Conference, U.S. Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federalcourts/governance-judicial-conference/about-judicial-conference [https://perma.cc/SNS7-9F
DL].
25
See Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, U.S. Courts (Oct. 1, 2016),
http://www.uscourts.gov/file/committee-rules-practice-and-procedure-chairs-and-reporters
[https://perma.cc/2TM7-YBB2].
26
Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic
Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 Geo. L.J. 887, 902–07 (1999).
27
See, e.g., Letter from Sam C. Pointer, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to
Hon. Robert E. Keeton, Chairman, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure, 146
F.R.D. 519, 523–25 (1992) (detailing changes made to the Rule 11 proposal in response to
public comments). See generally Scott Dodson, A Negative Retrospective of Rule 23, 92
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 917 (2017) (explaining the influence of dynamic social and political
conditions on proposals to reform Rule 23).
28
See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Federal Court Rulemaking and
Institutional Reform: An Institutional Approach, 15 Nev. L.J. 1559, 1595–96 (2015).
29
Struve, supra note 16, at 1103–04; see also Stephen C. Yeazell, Judging Rules, Ruling
Judges, 61 Law & Contemp. Probs. 229, 235 (1998).
30
See, e.g., Order, 374 U.S. 863, 882–83 (1963) (amending Rule 25); Order, 367 U.S.
1009, 1015 (1961) (amending Rule 25); Order, 308 U.S. 642 (1939) (amending Rule 81);
Clark, supra note 19, at 252 (reporting that the Court sua sponte amended Rule 46 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1956); Struve, supra note 16, at 1106 n.11 (reporting
that the Court rejected some amendments prior to 1958).
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appointment of trusted Committee members has left the Supreme Court
with little effective role in rule promulgation. Although the Act
delegates the ultimate authority for prescribing rules to the Supreme
Court,31 as a practical matter, the Supreme Court today acts principally
as a “rubber stamp[] in the rulemaking process,” and individual justices
rarely dissent from rule approval.32
In some ways, this separation at the rulemaking stage makes sense.
The rulemakers are institutionally better equipped than the Court to draft
rules and legislate rule policy for the lower courts. Rules Committee
membership is dominated by sitting lower-court judges and lawyers who
use the rules in everyday practice and actual cases.33 The Rules
Committees fulfill the Judicial Conference’s obligation to continuously
study the rules,34 and they do, often with the benefit of empirical data
and studies commissioned from the Federal Judicial Center.35 Because
the rules are “interdependent,” multiple and simultaneous rule
amendments can be “tightly coordinated.”36
In contrast, the Supreme Court is far less equipped to engage in
rulemaking.37 The justices have limited federal trial-level experience and
lack the procedural expertise of the rulemakers.38 Indeed, justices have
openly confessed ignorance of how the rules work in practice and what
problems they present or solve.39 And the Court has neither the time nor
31

28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2012).
See Marcus, supra note 20, at 961. Congress also rarely intervenes. See Bone, supra note
26, at 908; Struve, supra note 16, at 1115 & n.55.
33
Bone, supra note 26, at 896.
34
28 U.S.C. § 331.
35
See Thomas E. Willging, Past and Potential Uses of Empirical Research in Civil
Rulemaking, 77 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1121, 1124 (2002).
36
Bone, supra note 26, at 946.
37
Marcus, supra note 20, at 944.
38
Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 Duke L.J. 1, 86–87 (2010) (“The Justices do not have the time,
trial-court experience, or on-the-ground information to evaluate the consequences that
procedural changes may have on private enforcement of substantive law or what alternative
enforcement mechanisms should be established if litigation pathways are impaired.”).
39
See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 13–17, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)
(No. 07-1015) (Breyer, J.) (“I can’t remember my civil procedure course.”); Order, 146
F.R.D. 401, 504–05 (1993) (statement of White, J.) (“[T]he trial practice is a dynamic
profession, and the longer one is away from it the less likely it is that he or she should
presume to second-guess the careful work of the active professionals manning the
32
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the resources to study the workings of the rules in a specific context or
on a more general, ongoing basis. Accordingly, the Court rarely
interferes in rulemaking.40
B. The Adjudicative Separation
At the same time, the Rules Committees play their rulemaking role
without engaging in the titration of their rules through the adjudicatory
process. Two reasons seem to guide this separation.
First, the Rules Committees, in particular, see their role as rulemakers
as separate from the Court’s roles as adjudicator and interpreter. Much
like Congress with legislation, the Rules Committees take responsibility
for the drafting of the law and leave its application and exposition in
cases to the courts.
But even Congress occasionally files an amicus brief to make the
Court aware of facts stemming from Congress’s institutional knowledge
or expertise.41 And, in any event, the Rules Committees in this context
are less like Congress and more like agencies.42 Like agencies, the Rules
Committees have direct experience and specialized knowledge, which
they use to set agendas and incorporate policy preferences into the
rules.43 Like agency regulations, the rules pass through a notice-andcomment period.44 These similarities suggest that the Rules Committees,

rulemaking committees . . . .”); Order, 409 U.S. 1132, 1132–33 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the justices are “so far removed from the trial arena that [they] have
no special insight, no meaningful oversight to contribute”).
40
Individual justices—including Frankfurter, Black, Douglas, Powell, Stewart, and
Rehnquist—have openly disclaimed independent judgment and instead expressed full
deference to the Advisory Committee in approving the rules. See Struve, supra note 16, at
1127–29, 1154; cf. Order, 146 F.R.D. at 403 (letter from Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist) (“While the Court is satisfied that the required procedures have been observed,
this transmittal does not necessarily indicate that the Court itself would have proposed these
amendments in the form submitted.”).
41
Amanda Frost, Congress in Court, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 914, 964 (2012).
42
The loose analogy of the Rules Committees to agencies has been recognized by many
others. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 14, at 1193; Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 9, at
1191–93; Porter, supra note 2, at 152–53, 176.
43
See Porter, supra note 2, at 151–52.
44
Procedures Governing the Rulemaking Process, U.S. Courts (Dec. 1, 2015),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/laws-and-proceduresgoverning-work-rules-committees-0 [https://perma.cc/P44A-9F5E].
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like agencies, ought to have a say when the Court interprets or construes
the rules they drafted.45
The second reason for the separation is that the Supreme Court is
more institutionally equipped than the rulemakers at adjudication of
disputes and case-specific application of the rules,46 so even if the
rulemakers thought it appropriate to bridge the gap, they might believe
they have little to add.
The relative capacities of the Court and the Rules Committees in
matters of adjudication do not mean that adjudication—and the rule
interpretation necessarily attendant to it—should be uninformed by
rulemaker expertise. Indeed, accurate rule interpretation often draws
upon information primarily in the hands of the rulemakers, such as
rulemaker intent, the purpose of the rule, how the rule interrelates to
other rules, the history of the rule and relevant amendment proposals,
the “legislative facts” underlying the rule, and how the rule currently
works in practice.47
45

Agencies typically get a say at the adjudicative stage. See infra text accompanying notes
145–62. Some agencies even have independent interpretative authority. See M. Elizabeth
Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1383, 1386–91, 1400,
1403 (2004).
46
Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 10, at 86; Porter, supra note 2, at 182.
47
See Bus. Guides v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enters., 498 U.S. 533, 546 (1991) (treating
rulemaker intent as relevant to its interpretative analysis); Am. Bar Ass’n, Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: Proceedings of the Institute at Washington, D.C., October 6, 7, 8, 1938 and
of the Symposium at New York City, October 17, 18, 19, 1938, at 224–25 (Edward H.
Hammond ed., 1939) (statement of Advisory Committee Chairman William Mitchell)
(arguing that copies of preliminary drafts, Committee reports, meeting notes, and articles
written by Committee members should all be relevant to rule interpretation and application).
I do not mean to defend, as others have, a particular methodology of rule interpretation.
See, e.g., Joseph P. Bauer, Schiavone: An Un-Fortune-ate Illustration of the Supreme
Court’s Role as Interpreter of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63 Notre Dame L. Rev.
720, 728–29 (1988) (arguing that the Court has broad latitude to interpret the rules and that
“the historical views of the Advisory Committee—which merely drafted the Rule—of its
meaning should be entitled only to limited weight”); Marcus, supra note 20, at 928–29, 957
(urging reliance on “rulemaker intent and purpose”); Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme
Court’s Role in Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 Hastings L.J. 1039,
1093 (1993) (advocating for “a more activist role in the interpretive stage”); Struve, supra
note 16, at 1102–03 (calling for judicial restraint and deference to the Advisory Committee
notes); cf. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989) (urging rules
to be interpreted as statutes). Compare Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 31 (1986)
(“Although the Advisory Committee’s comments do not foreclose judicial consideration of
the Rule’s validity and meaning, the construction given by the Committee is ‘of weight.’”
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The constraints of adjudication can hamper the Court’s ability to
gather this information effectively in order to construe rules accurately.
When deciding a specific case, the Court is cabined by the happenstance
of the facts of the case, the applicable law, and the parties’ arguments.
The Court follows principles of stare decisis and focuses first on the
narrow dispute at stake rather than broader questions of the rule and its
interrelatedness to other rules or statutes or interests.48 These
adjudicatory constraints, coupled with a lack of rulemaker input, risk
suboptimal decision making in rule-interpretation cases. The following
case studies involving important rule interpretations illustrate this
claim.49
1. Rule 8: Twombly
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,50 a putative class of
telecommunications subscribers sued regional telecommunications
providers for an antitrust conspiracy to avoid competing in each other’s
regions.51 The complaint alleged facts supporting conscious parallel
conduct—i.e., each provider staying within its own territory and
(quoting Miss. Publ’ing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444 (1946))), with Krupski v.
Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538, 557 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The Advisory
Committee’s insights into the proper interpretation of a Rule’s text are useful to the same
extent as any scholarly commentary. But the Committee’s intentions have no effect on the
Rule’s meaning.”).
48
Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 9, at 1209–11. The Court is ambivalent about how to
approach rule interpretation in this context. See Porter, supra note 2, at 127–28 (identifying
two interpretive methodologies).
49
By emphasizing these particular cases, I do not mean to suggest that other illustrations
do not exist. In Schiavone, for example, the Court construed Rule 15(c) to deny relation back
under certain facts. 477 U.S. at 30–31. No amicus briefs were filed. The then-Reporter for
the Advisory Committee later wrote that Schiavone’s interpretation “seemed inconsistent
with the purpose of Rule 15(c) . . . [and] at odds with the aims expressed in Rule 1,” Paul D.
Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on Experience, 60 Duke
L.J. 597, 619 (2010), and the Rules Committees swiftly drafted amendments to abrogate the
reasoning of Schiavone, see Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 134 F.R.D.
525, 574, 637–38 (1991), including an Advisory Committee Note stating that “the Court
reached a result in Schiavone v. Fortune that was inconsistent with the liberal pleading
practices secured by Rule 8,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(3) advisory commitee’s note to 1991
amendment. Perhaps the Court would have reached a different result had the Advisory
Committee’s views been put before it at the time.
50
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
51
Id. at 550–51.
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knowing that the others were doing the same—and that the parallel
conduct was the result of an agreement among the providers not to
compete.52
The Supreme Court held that the complaint failed to meet the
standard of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief,”53 and it ordered the complaint dismissed
under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted.54 The Court, however, “barely glance[d] at the text of” the
rules.55 Instead, it focused on pleading policy, and it found illumination
in the Court’s own understanding of civil litigation.56 This focus led the
Court to make four major changes to pleading standards, all of which
were in error,57 and all of which were made without the benefit of
rulemaker input.
First, the Court created a new standard that the complaint state a
claim that is “plausible.”58 This plausibility standard requires the
pleading of sufficient facts, independent of giving notice.59 But Rule 8
has never been understood to require the pleading of facts in this way.
Indeed, the drafters of Rule 8 specifically dispensed with the prior

52

Id.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
54
Id. 12(b)(6); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
55
Porter, supra note 2, at 137. The Court’s sole textual hook was that the complaint
“show[]” entitlement to relief, see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, an embarrassingly thin reed on
which to work a major change in pleading standards.
56
Marcus, supra note 20, at 973 (“[T]he Court [in Twombly] made no attempt to unpack
rule text or unearth rule maker intent or purpose and instead based its decision on policy
concerns.”).
57
Edward A. Purcell, Jr., From the Particular to the General: Three Federal Rules and the
Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1731, 1736 (2014)
(“[I]n imposing a plausibility requirement for pleadings, Twombly and Iqbal not only
departed from the text and original understanding of Rule 8 but also rejected hundreds of
years of legal practice defining the nature of the motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim.”).
58
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (asserting that a complaint must have “enough factual matter
(taken as true) to suggest” unlawful conduct and that this standard “calls for enough fact to
raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement”).
59
See Scott Dodson, Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards, 158 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 441, 460 & n.117, 461–62 & nn.126–27 (2010).
53
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regime’s requirement of pleading facts.60 Instead, the drafters meant to
instill a more relaxed regime focused on notice61 and to confine the
pleading of facts to that goal.62 It is worth noting that the Rules
Committees had studied the relatively low standard of Rule 8
continuously since the famous case of Conley v. Gibson and had
repeatedly declined to amend it to impose a higher standard despite
invitations to do so by the Supreme Court.63
Second, the Court interred the venerable language from Conley that
“a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”64 The Twombly
Court suggested that this language could mean that “a wholly conclusory
statement of claim would survive a motion to dismiss,”65 and it therefore
disapproved of the standard.66 But the Court misread Conley and ignored
the proper remedy already existing in the rules. Conley was right: a
complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) in such
circumstances. The problem of a “the defendant acted unlawfully and
caused me injury” complaint—the failure to provide adequate notice—is
remedied by a rule specifically directed to that problem: a Rule 12(e)
motion for a more definite statement.67 The majority opinion does not
even acknowledge Rule 12(e).

60

See id. at 449; cf. 1848 N.Y. Laws 521 (requiring “[a] statement of the facts constituting
the cause of action”).
61
See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 433, 433 (1986).
62
See Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 460–61 (1943); see also Kevin
M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 Iowa L. Rev.
821, 825 (2010).
63
See Lonny Hoffman, Rulemaking in the Age of Twombly and Iqbal, 46 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 1483, 1503–11 (2013).
64
355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957) (citing Leimer v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 108 F.2d
302 (1940); Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (1944); and Cont’l Collieries v. Shober, 130
F.2d 631 (1942)).
65
550 U.S. at 561.
66
Id. at 563.
67
See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 Wis. L.
Rev. 535, 553. This was the contemporaneous understanding of Rule 12(e) at the time of its
adoption. See James A. Pike, Objections to Pleadings Under the New Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 47 Yale L.J. 50, 62 (1937).
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Third, the Court distinguished between legal conclusions and factual
allegations. Specifically, it disregarded the complaint’s allegations of an
agreement and antitrust conspiracy because “these are merely legal
conclusions resting on the prior allegations.”68 But allegations like
“agreement” and “conspiracy” straddle the line between legal
conclusions and factual allegations, as even the author of Twombly later
appeared to confess,69 and they mark a line that, in any event, was
abandoned by the 1930s rulemakers as unworkable in practice.70
Fourth, the Court justified all these changes as necessary to control
discovery costs, especially in the kind of massive antitrust class action at
issue in Twombly.71 The discovery rules already give judges tools to
control discovery costs,72 but the Court dismissed them “given the
common lament that the success of judicial supervision in checking
discovery abuse has been on the modest side.”73 As support for this
“common lament,” the Court cited to a 1989 article by Judge Frank
Easterbrook.74 And the Court reasoned that the existence of controls was
beside the point in any event because “the threat of discovery expense
will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases before
reaching those proceedings.”75
Yet reports by the Federal Judicial Center, the research arm of the
judiciary and a regular data collector for the Rules Committees, have
repeatedly concluded that discovery costs are under control in the vast

68

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 698–99 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting) (finding no
daylight between the allegations deemed conclusory by the majority and the allegations
deemed nonconclusory by the majority).
70
See Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1919, 1930
(2009); cf. Charles E. Clark, Handbook of the Law of Code Pleading 225–27 (2d ed. 1947)
(recounting the hopeless code-pleading distinctions among ultimate facts, evidentiary facts,
and conclusions of law).
71
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558–59; Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109
Mich. L. Rev. 53, 64 (2010).
72
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 593–94 n.13, 596 n.15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73
Id. at 559 (citing Frank Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 635, 638
(1989)).
74
Id. at 559, 560 n.6.
75
Id. at 559.
69
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majority of cases and that discovery abuse is rare.76 Further, the claim
that frivolous lawsuits cause high-stakes choices is not supported
empirically.77 The data do suggest that meritless litigation and high
discovery costs can be problematic in a small category of cases, but the
data as a whole do not justify a transsubstantive rule change of pleading
standards.78 Equally troubling is that there is no evidence that the change
worked by Twombly will even address the problem surmised by the
Court,79 especially in light of the dynamism of litigation.80
For each of these errors, the terse text of Rule 8 and its sparse
Advisory Committee Note no doubt left room for Twombly’s creative
revisionism. The lack of guidance allowed the Court to cherry-pick from
among sources, including partisan amicus briefs, to rely on its own ipse
dixit factfinding on discovery costs to justify its conclusions,81 and to
craft a transsubstantive solution for the circumstances of an atypical

76

See generally Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Fed. Judicial Ctr., National,
Case-Based Civil Rules Survey: Preliminary Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules (2009), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/DisSurv1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RNF5-85GG] (reporting that satisfaction with the pretrial process is
relatively high and discovery costs are relatively reasonable); Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery
in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for
Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1393 (1994) (disputing the perception of
widespread discovery abuse). The rules specifically deal with the alleviation of costs of
electronic discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
77
See Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 519, 579 (1997)
(“The results of our formal analysis neither rule out nor clearly confirm a serious frivolous
suit problem.”).
78
See id. at 589.
79
Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 Ind. L.J. 119, 125–26
(2011). See also Jonah B. Gelbach, Material Facts in the Debate over Twombly and Iqbal, 68
Stan. L. Rev. 369, 376–77 (2016) (concluding that “empirics cannot conclusively resolve the
case-quality aspects of the Twiqbal debate”).
80
See Scott Dodson, A Closer Look at New Pleading in the Litigation Marketplace, 99
Judicature, no. 2, 2015, at 11, 13–14, 16–17 (detailing some of the costs and ancillary effects
of the new pleading standard).
81
No party or amicus brief offered any data regarding discovery costs. See Clermont &
Yeazell, supra note 62, at 848.
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case.82 The Court subsequently compounded the errors of Twombly in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, a case that relied almost exclusively on Twombly.83
As customary, the Rules Committees did not participate in any way in
Twombly. Yet the Rules Committees had information that could have
been useful to the Court and perhaps could have swayed the outcome.
They had information about discovery costs, about the interconnections
among various pleading rules and between pleading rules and discovery
rules, about the abilities of lower courts to control discovery, and about
the reasons why the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules had repeatedly
declined to amend Rule 8 or disapprove of Conley.84 The Rules
Committees could have explained that the “short and plain statement of
the claim” language was deliberately different from previous standard
requiring a “statement of facts constituting a cause of action,” that the
drafters of Rule 8 deliberately avoided the terms “cause of action” and
“statement of facts,” that legal conclusions can serve notice purposes as
readily as factual allegations, and that no member of the 1930s Advisory
Committee thought Rule 8 should serve a factual-sufficiency function.85
These efforts would not require communing with the spirit of Charles
Clark, the chief drafter of Rule 8; the information I identify was already
in the hands of the Rules Committees. And Rule Committee
endorsement of information such as the rarity of disproportionate
discovery costs and the efficacy of judicial case management would
have made it hard for the Court to rely on the contrary evidence and
arguments that it did. It is difficult to imagine how Justice Souter could
have written Twombly in the face of Rules Committee support for the
dissent’s arguments and their predicate facts. But in the absence of an
authoritative source for this information, and with the Solicitor General

82
See Marcus, supra note 20, at 944–45; Suja A. Thomas, How Atypical, Hard Cases
Make Bad Law (See, e.g., the Lack of Judicial Restraint in Wal-Mart, Twombly, and Ricci),
48 Wake Forest L. Rev. 989, 991–92 (2013).
83
See 556 U.S. 662 (2009). For a complete history and analysis of the two cases, see Scott
Dodson, New Pleading in the Twenty-First Century: Slamming the Federal Courthouse
Doors? 47–75 (2013).
84
Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 9, at 1220. Indeed, the Rules Committees that year
approved important e-discovery amendments that codified mechanisms for controlling ediscovery costs, including cost-shifting. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).
85
Marcus, supra note 20, at 976–80, 983.
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voicing support for the defendants,86 the Court sidestepped the
arguments in the dissent, effectively rewrote Rule 8, and dramatically
altered civil pleading.87
2. Rule 23: Dukes
As with Twombly, rulemaker input could have illuminated a recent
decision interpreting Rule 23, the federal class-action rule. In Wal-Mart
Stores v. Dukes,88 a nationwide class of 1.5 million current and former
female Wal-Mart employees sued the retail giant for gender
discrimination in promotions.89 The Court held that the class could not
be certified90 and, in the process, glossed Rule 23(a)(2) in an important
new way.
Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement demands, for certification,
“questions of law or fact common to the class.”91 The Court’s focus on
commonality was curious because Wal-Mart’s petition for certiorari
barely mentioned commonality,92 no doubt because commonality had
always been a relatively easy condition to satisfy and because the
claimants seemed to easily satisfy it in the case.93 The claimants posed
common questions such as whether the women were subjected to
unlawful discrimination, whether they all worked for Wal-Mart, and, as
Justice Ginsburg pointed out in her concurrence, whether they were

86
For a more detailed discussion of the Solicitor General’s influence on the Court in
Twombly, see infra text accompanying notes 138–41.
87
Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 849, 883–85 (2010) (arguing that the Court effectively
engaged in rulemaking); Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court,
and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 286, 333–34 (2013) (asserting that the Court “essentially rewrote Rule 8”).
88
564 U.S. 338 (2011).
89
Id. at 342.
90
Id. at 348–60. The Court interpreted other parts of Rule 23 in problematic ways—
including Rule 23(b)(2) and the level of evidentiary proof required for certification. Id. at
360–67. I do not address those issues here, but they seem like apt candidates for useful input
by the Rules Committees as well.
91
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
92
Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. 729, 774 (2013).
93
See id. at 773; A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and
Declining Access to Justice, 93 B.U. L. Rev. 441, 443 (2013).
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subjected to excessively discretionary decision making that led to
disparate results in promotions.94
But the Court added a second issue on certiorari to address
commonality,95 and Wal-Mart, along with a number of other amici such
as the Chamber of Commerce (but not the Solicitor General), devoted
significant briefing to the opportunity to limit Rule 23(a)(2).96
The Court eagerly took the bait. It interpreted Rule 23(a)(2) to require
common questions to speak to whether all class members have suffered
the same injury, such that there is a common question that is “central to
the validity of each one of the claims” and whose answer is “capable of
classwide resolution.”97 This formulation, seemingly adopted in part
from a law review article whose author was not even discussing Rule
23(a)(2),98 changed the commonality requirement from a relatively easy
condition of common law or fact to a much more difficult condition of
common rights or relief99—a change that has foiled many certification
attempts since.100 As in the Rule 8 context, the Court subsequently
entrenched its errors by relying heavily on Dukes in later cases.101
The current version of Rule 23(a) has remained essentially unchanged
since 1966, and its drafters did not anticipate the many changes in the
substantive law and in class-action practice that occurred after its
94

Dukes, 564 U.S. at 370–71 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This
“would seem sufficient to satisfy the common question requirement.” Richard Marcus,
Bending in the Breeze: American Class Actions in the Twenty-First Century, 65 DePaul L.
Rev. 497, 507 (2016).
95
Klonoff, supra note 92, at 774.
96
Id. For more on the refusal of the Solicitor General to participate, see infra text
accompanying note 136.
97
Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350. For an argument that “the Court’s holding does not speak
primarily to the content of Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement,” but instead “sounds in
the liability policies of Title VII,” see Tobias Barrington Wolff, Managerial Judging and
Substantive Law, 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1027, 1038 (2013).
98
See Klonoff, supra note 92, at 776–80 (referencing Richard A. Nagareda, Class
Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97, 131–32 (2009)); Spencer,
supra note 93, at 471–72 (same).
99
See Robert G. Bone, The Misguided Search for Class Unity, 82 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
651, 700 (2014); Spencer, supra note 93, at 472–73.
100
See Klonoff, supra note 92, at 778–79; Spencer, supra note 93, at 445–48.
101
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2013) (citing Dukes in discussing the
certification-proof standard and offering dictum support for the need for admissible evidence
to show that the case is susceptible to awarding damages on a class-wide basis).
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enactment.102 Yet Congress passed Title VII, the law under which the
plaintiffs sued in Dukes, in 1964 with private enforcement of its norms
in mind.103 The 1966 drafters specifically adapted Rule 23(b)(2) to those
kinds of discrimination claims. Further, Rule 23(a) and its antecedents
had a rich and defined pedigree that could have informed the Court’s
decision making.104
Rule Committee involvement, then, could have informed the Court
that its commonality interpretation, in the words of one of the Advisory
Committee’s current members, “cannot be squared with the text,
structure, or history of Rule 23(a)(2).”105 In the absence of textual
support, the Rules Committees could have explained Rule 23(a)(2) in
light of its historical pedigree: that the 1966 drafters abandoned notions
of common rights and common relief and opted to retain only the
condition of common questions of law or fact.106 Such a view could have
persuaded the Court that its common injury requirement, in the
estimation of a former reporter, “demands more than the drafters of Rule
23(a)(2) ever intended be necessary.”107 Further, the Rules Committees
could have detailed subsequent Committee study of Rule 23, explained
why Rule 23(a) was not amended, and documented the changed attitudes
toward individualism and commonality108 that might have informed the
Court’s approach to the rule. The Rules Committees did not, and Dukes
became law.

102

See Arthur R. Miller, Keynote Address, The Preservation and Rejuvenation of
Aggregate Litigation: A Systemic Imperative, 64 Emory L.J. 293, 295 (2014).
103
See Sean Farhang, The Litigation State: Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the
U.S. 94–101 (2010).
104
See Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the
History of Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. Rev. 213, 301–04 (1990) (book review);
see generally Stephen C. Yeazell, From Medieval Group Litigation to the Modern Class
Action (1987) (documenting the history of Rule 23 from medieval times to 1966).
105
Klonoff, supra note 92, at 776; see also Purcell, supra note 57, at 1735 (characterizing
the opinion as having a “highly questionable legal foundation”).
106
Spencer, supra note 93, at 461–65.
107
Miller, supra note 102, at 298.
108
See Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, WalMart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 78, 148–53 (2011); Judith Resnik,
From “Cases” to “Litigation,” 54 Law & Contemp. Probs. 5, 8–11 (1991).
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II. BRIDGING THE SEPARATION WITH AN AMICUS PRACTICE
These case studies suggest that the separation between the Rules
Committees and the Supreme Court at the adjudicative stage can lead to
impoverished decision making and erroneous rule interpretation. One
solution is to narrow the adjudicatory separation between the Rules
Committees and the Court. And there is an easy way to narrow the
separation, one that neither disrupts the existing adjudicative structure
nor infringes upon the Court’s core adjudicatory powers but rather offers
the Court the information it needs to perform its adjudicatory function
optimally. The solution is to give the Rules Committees an amicus role
in the adjudication.
The idea initially may seem to create an odd intrabranch dynamic—in
some sense, the judiciary could be seen as arguing before itself. But
Article III does not prevent such an arrangement,109 and, upon deeper
reflection, the concept is no stranger than having the judiciary act as
legislature (drafting the rules), executive (executing the rules), and
judiciary (interpreting the rules).110 Further, in other contexts, the
rulemaker gets a voice in how its rules should be interpreted. State
solicitors general get a voice in how state laws are interpreted; the
Department of Justice (or sometimes Congress or an independent
agency) gets a voice in how federal laws are interpreted; agencies, ethics
commissions, bar organizations, and the like can issue advisory
opinions.
Nevertheless, federal-court rulemakers stay silent. And without
rulemaker input, assistance in rule interpretation falls to the Court,
parties, and amici, all of which are suboptimal because they represent
different interests from rulemakers and lack the firsthand knowledge and
expertise of the rulemakers. What is needed is Rules Committee
participation, and the most logical and defensible place for Rules
109

The Court has appointed counsel to represent the judicial branch and prosecute
contempt actions when the Department of Justice is unwilling to do so, see Young v. United
States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 814 (1987), and even the Solicitor General
has taken the position that such an appointment is consistent with judicial powers under
Article III, see Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8 n.2,
United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693 (1988) (No. 87-65), 1987 WL
881049.
110
Cf. Porter, supra note 2, at 183 (“Recognizing the power of the Court as a rulemaker
gives theories of deference to rulemaking a whiff of circularity, if not of self-dealing.”).
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Committee participation is in the well-established form of the amicus
brief.
A. Why Amicus Curiae?
Historically, the amicus was a true “friend,” “without having an
interest in the cause,” who offered “his own knowledge . . . for the
information of the presiding judge.”111 The amicus often helped the court
understand how a ruling might affect nonparties.112 As one court put it:
“He acts for no one, but simply seeks to give information to the
Court.”113 In England, for example, a member of Parliament once
informed the court as amicus of the intent of the legislature.114
Once a rarity, amicus briefs now are filed in more than eighty-five
percent of the Court’s argued cases.115 Most amicus briefs urge the Court
to decide for a particular party.116 Empirical studies have shown that
amicus participation can make a difference in the outcome of the
decision.117
As a result, judges often criticize amicus briefs on the ground that
they are not really neutral but rather restate arguments and positions of
the parties.118 Some see amicus briefs as “the judicial counterpart of
lobbying and congressional hearings in the legislative process.”119
111

Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 Yale L.J.
694, 694 (1963) (quoting Benjamin Vaughan Abbott, Dictionary of Terms and Phrases Used
in American or English Jurisprudence 62–63 (1879)).
112
Id. at 696–97.
113
Campbell v. Swasey, 12 Ind. 70, 72 (1859).
114
Krislov, supra note 111, at 695.
115
Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, The Choices Justices Make 4 n.b (1998); Joseph D.
Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme
Court, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 743, 744 (2000); Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus
Facts, 100 Va. L. Rev. 1757, 1768 (2014).
116
Kearney & Merrill, supra note 115, at 841–42. For a history of the amicus, especially
its American transition from neutral “friend” to party advocate, see Krislov, supra note 111,
at 697–704.
117
Kearney & Merrill, supra note 115, at 749–50.
118
See Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir.
1997) (Posner, J.) (“The vast majority of amicus curiae briefs are filed by allies of litigants
and duplicate the arguments made in the litigants’ briefs, in effect merely extending the
length of the litigant’s briefs. Such amicus briefs should not be allowed.”).
119
Krislov, supra note 111, at 717.
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Justice Scalia once bemoaned: “There is no self-interested organization
out there devoted to pursuit of the truth in the federal courts.”120
An amicus brief from the Rules Committees, however, has the
potential to fill the nonpartisan gap that Justice Scalia identified, in the
forgotten tradition of a true “friend of the court.” By statute and
regulation, the Rules Committees are composed primarily of neutral
experts charged with “carry[ing] on a continuous study of the [Rules’]
operation and effect”121 for purposes of “recommend[ing] to the Judicial
Conference rules of practice, procedure, and evidence and such changes
in rules . . . as may be necessary to maintain consistency and otherwise
promote the interest of justice.”122 The business of the Rules Committees
is to promote the neutral efficacy of the federal rules.
B. The Inadequacies of the Solicitor General
Amicus practice on behalf of the United States is already dominated
by a particular repeat advocate who commands the trust of the Court and
possesses the appearance of neutrality: the Solicitor General.123 The
Solicitor General is charged with representing the interests of the United
States as whole, which ostensibly includes the interests of the judicial
branch, and the Solicitor General does occasionally file amicus briefs on
behalf of the United States in private-party cases involving rule
interpretation.124 If the Solicitor General represents these interests, why
then, one might wonder, should the Rules Committees be given any
role? Why not just trust the Solicitor General?
This objection gains additional force because the Department of
Justice is, formally, a part of the rulemaking process. Each Rules
Committee includes at least one ex officio member from the Department
120

Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 35–36 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
28 U.S.C. § 331 (2012).
122
28 U.S.C. § 2073(b).
123
The Solicitor General participates as party or amicus in more than half of the Court’s
merits docket. See Michael E. Solimine, The Solicitor General Unbound: Amicus Curiae
Activism and Deference in the Supreme Court, 45 Ariz. St. L.J. 1183, 1185 (2013). For
seminal books on the Solicitor General, see Lincoln Caplan, The Tenth Justice: The Solicitor
General and the Rule of Law (1987), and Rebecca Mae Salokar, The Solicitor General: The
Politics of Law (1992).
124
See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Unitherm
Food Sys. v. Swift-Eckrich, 546 U.S. 394 (2006) (No. 04-597).
121
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of Justice.125 The Solicitor General him- or herself is an ex officio
member of the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules.126 On rare
occasions, the Solicitor General has proposed new rules to the Standing
Committee.127 In some instances, especially the failed class-action
reform efforts of 1978, the Justice Department has taken an active role
in pressing amendments with the Advisory Committee and Congress.128
But the connection between the Solicitor General and the rulemaking
process is more attenuated in practice than it formally appears. Direct
participation by the Solicitor General in the rulemaking process is rare to
nonexistent.129 The Department of Justice members of the Rules
Committees primarily voice the interests of the government as litigant,
especially for criminal rules when the executive branch acts as
prosecutor. Often, internal tensions within the Department of Justice
mean that the representative cannot effectively advocate in the
rulemaking process at all.130 Outside of the formal committee
membership, communication between the Justice Department and the
Rules Committees has always been sporadic at best.131 And there is no
evidence that, at the adjudicative stage, the Solicitor General consults
even with the particular Justice Department representatives who serve
on the Rules Committees. Accordingly, the formal participation of the
125
Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedure Chairs and Reporters, U.S. Courts
(Oct. 25, 2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/committee-rules-practice-and-procedure-chairs
-and-reporters [https://perma.cc/2TM7-YBB2].
126
Id.
127
For one example, see Scott E. Gant, Missing the Forest for a Tree: Unpublished
Opinions and New Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, 47 B.C. L. Rev. 705, 720–21
(2006).
128
See David Freeman Engstrom, Jacobins at Justice: The (Failed) Class Action
Revolution of 1978 and the Puzzle of American Procedural Political Economy, 165 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1531, 1535 (2017).
129
See E-mail from Donald B. Verilli, Former Solicitor General of the U.S., to Scott
Dodson (Nov. 11, 2016) (on file with author); Telephone Interview with John Rabiej, supra
note 13.
130
See Eileen A. Scallen, Analyzing “The Politics of [Evidence] Rulemaking,” 53
Hastings L.J. 843, 873–74 (2002) (summarizing the reflections of a former Department of
Justice representative to the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence).
131
See Engstrom, supra note 128, at 1548–49 (offering one brief episode of
communication between DOJ and the Civil Rules Advisory Committee regarding an
executive-branch push for class-action reform but that DOJ “had not even been made aware
of” the Committee’s deliberations on Rule 23 reform).
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Department of Justice does not translate to a functional representation by
the Solicitor General of the input or views of the Rules Committees.
But even were the Solicitor General attuned to the rulemaking
process, the Solicitor General cannot be expected to fairly represent the
Rules Committees’ interests at the adjudicative stage. There is no doubt
that Solicitors General see themselves, at least in some respects, as the
“Tenth Justice,” concerned with the greater interests of the government
and in partnership with the Court to make the laws work effectively.132
But the Solicitor General also represents the interests of the government
as a party to the litigation.133 And, as a member of the executive branch
who serves at the pleasure of the President, the Solicitor General often
represents the political or institutional interests of the executive branch,
or, even more narrowly, the President.134 These structural features no
doubt help explain why scholars have concluded that the Solicitor
General’s amicus practice is partisan.135
Further, the Solicitor General’s primary amicus view in most rules
cases almost certainly will be biased heavily toward representing the
United States’s interests as a future party litigating under the rules.
Accordingly, the Solicitor General’s position is likely to be heavily
132

Caplan, supra note 123, at 17–18.
David A. Strauss, The Solicitor General and the Interests of the United States, 61 Law
& Contemp. Probs. 165, 167–75 (1998).
134
See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Solicitor General’s
Changing Role in Supreme Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 1323, 1363–65 (2010); Neal
Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control over Independent Agency
Litigation, 82 Calif. L. Rev. 255, 284–87 (1994); Louis Fisher, Is the Solicitor General an
Executive or a Judicial Agent? Caplan’s Tenth Justice, 15 Law & Soc. Inquiry 305, 306–07
(1990) (book review); Michael W. McConnell, The Rule of Law and the Role of the
Solicitor General, 21 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1105, 1105–08 (1988); John O. McGinnis, Principle
Versus Politics: The Solicitor General’s Office in Constitutional and Bureaucratic Theory,
44 Stan. L. Rev. 799, 802–05 (1992) (book review); cf. Luther A. Huston et al., Roles of the
Attorney General of the United States 52 (1968) (explaining that the Attorney General is
expected to act as the President’s advocate).
135
See Elliott Karr, Independent Litigation Authority and Calls for the Views of the
Solicitor General, 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1080, 1085–89 (2009) (reporting presidential
pressure on the Solicitor General’s advocacy); Karen O’Connor, The Amicus Curiae Role of
the U.S. Solicitor General in Supreme Court Litigation, 66 Judicature, no. 6, 1983, at 256,
261–64 (1983) (finding that Solicitors General in Republican administrations file amicus
briefs in more criminal cases and fewer civil-rights cases than Solicitors General in
Democratic administrations); see also Krislov, supra note 111, at 714, 720 (arguing that the
Solicitor General as amicus is prone to policy and ideological advocacy).
133
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influenced by this consideration rather than by the consideration of
impartially reflecting the judicial interests at stake.
These political and branch-specific interests undoubtedly will collide
with the judiciary’s interests in fair and workable court rules. The
President, executive branch, and Justice Department may have views,
for example, on how class-action practice should affect Title VII
enforcement (as in Dukes) or what kinds of pleading standards should
attach to private antitrust claims in light of the Federal Trade
Commission’s antitrust policies (as in Twombly). And because the
President has no power over the judicial branch—unlike most agency
heads, who serve at the pleasure of the President—the President and
Justice Department can press a rule-interpretation agenda only through
advocacy in adjudication.
Indeed, the Solicitor General declined to file an amicus brief in Dukes
even though the case presented a set of crucially important issues to
class-action practice, and even though the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) filed an amicus brief in the lower
courts.136 Perhaps the Solicitor General could not reconcile the policy
implications of private enforcement of Title VII (as the EEOC
pressed)137 with the business lobby that is so important to electoral
politics (as the President may have foreseen) and with the possibility
that the United States could be a class-action defendant in similar cases
(as other agencies may have feared). It is not a stretch to surmise that the
interests in the effective functioning and proper interpretation of Rule 23
played a subordinate role in the Solicitor General’s decision not to file a
brief. In any event, the absence of the Solicitor General left an amicus
void filled by the partisanship and cacophony of more than twenty-five
private amicus briefs.
In contrast, the Solicitor General—a Republican appointee—filed an
amicus brief in Twombly supporting the telecom defendants.138 The
Solicitor General’s brief framed the issue less as a rule-interpretation
issue and more as a substantive antitrust issue, identifying “a substantial
interest in the proper standard for allowing antitrust suits to move past
136

See Solimine, supra note 123, at 1206–07.
Id.
138
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (No. 05-1126).
137
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the motion-to-dismiss stage.”139 Nevertheless, the brief struck a strongly
partisan chord on rule interpretation, with little legal support in Rule 8,
that paralleled reasoning in the Court’s opinion. The Solicitor General
conjured the same unsupported specters of frivolous litigation, discovery
costs, and coerced settlements highlighted in the Court’s opinion.140 The
brief raises the same misplaced beef with Conley: that Conley “would
preclude dismissal even of totally conclusory complaints that provide
virtually no factual predicate for the alleged injury.”141 Notably absent
from the Solicitor General’s brief is any mention of other protections
against excessive discovery costs, any empirical evidence of the costs of
meritless suits or the incidence of discovery abuse, or any understanding
of how Rule 12(e) applies to Conley. It seems likely that the Solicitor
General’s brief had a profound effect on the Court’s opinion.
The Solicitor General’s role of centralizing litigation strategy for the
long-term interests of the government as a whole is appropriate for
executive interests in which disparate agencies may have “a more
parochial view of the interest of the Government in litigation.”142 But in
the context of court rules, the Solicitor General’s view is the one likely
to be parochial—focusing on government litigation and presidential
policy interests as opposed to the broader interests of the civil justice
system to all litigants and the judiciary. For this reason, the Rules
Committees should have a voice in rule-interpretation cases before the
Supreme Court.
C. Forms of Amicus Roles
Giving voice to the Rules Committees through participation in amicus
briefing could take a number of forms. This Section explores each.

139

Id. at 1–2.
Id. at 7 (arguing that a plaintiff with a meritless claim could “potentially force a
substantial settlement”); id. at 1–2 (asserting that meritless antitrust lawsuits “force parties
either to expend substantial resources to defend themselves or to succumb to in terrorem
settlement demands”); id. at 25 (worrying about “strike suits and in terrorem settlement
demands”).
141
Id. at 18.
142
FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 96 (1994).
140
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1. Weak Form: Consultation
The weakest form of Rules Committee amicus participation would
merely require the Solicitor General, which is the Justice Department’s
delegate for representing the interests of the United States before the
Supreme Court,143 to consult with the Rules Committees in any amicus
brief it files on an issue of rule interpretation or application. Currently,
when the Solicitor General files an amicus brief on an issue of rule
interpretation, the norm is that the Solicitor General neither seeks, nor
does the Rules Committees provide, consultation.144 Indeed, the
Advisory Committee appears reluctant to communicate with the
Solicitor General regarding current cases.
I find this somewhat odd. The regulation granting the Solicitor
General the Department of Justice’s Supreme Court practice directs the
Solicitor General to “consult[] with each agency or official
concerned.”145 After all, the Solicitor General needs to understand the
interests of the affected entities and needs to draw upon their expertise in
crafting the position of the United States. The same needs exist, perhaps
even with greater urgency, when the affected entity is the judicial branch
and the interest is the effective and appropriate functioning of court
rules.
No law would need to be changed to authorize this weak form of
Rules Committee participation. The Solicitor General and the Rules
Committees need only normalize the practice of consultation and craft
internal rules for its implementation.
The weak form of consultation has the advantage of being the least
disruptive of the Solicitor General’s status as primary representative of
the United States before the Supreme Court. It also creates the least
work for the Rules Committees—consultation is far less onerous than
independent brief drafting. In addition, it allows the Rules Committees’
interests to be represented by perhaps the most effective and frequent
Supreme Court advocate, who is highly credentialed and respected, is a

143
See 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(c) (2016) (“[The Solicitor General] [d]etermin[es] whether a brief
amicus curiae will be filed by the Government, or whether the Government will intervene, in
any appellate court.”).
144
See Email from Donald Verilli, supra note 129.
145
See 28 C.F.R. § 0.20.
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Court specialist, has few financial constraints, and boasts an
unparalleled win rate.146
The weak form of consultation has the disadvantage of subordinating
the judiciary’s interests to the authority of the Solicitor General. Even
after consultation, the Solicitor General may choose to present a position
in opposition to the views of the Rules Committees, express the views of
the Rules Committees in a way that is different from the way the Rules
Committees believe proper, decline to address issues deemed important
by the Rules Committees, or decline to file a brief in the case at all.147
An amicus-consultation-only role is particularly problematic when the
Solicitor General is already representing the United States as a party
litigant.
Nevertheless, this weak form, at the very least, would allow the Rules
Committees to offer some voice in the litigation—albeit one filtered
through and beholden to the whims of the Solicitor General.
2. Strong Form: Independent Amicus Authority
The strongest form of Rules Committee amicus participation would
give the Rules Committee the authority, independent of the Solicitor
General, to file an amicus brief in any case involving the interpretation
or application of a federal rule. This strong form would offer the Rules
Committees the autonomous ability to offer a position unfiltered by the
Solicitor General.
Congress would have to authorize this power through statutory
amendment. Although the Court routinely grants private entities’
requests to participate as amici,148 Congress has granted the Department
of Justice sole authority—with specified exceptions—to represent the

146

See Robert Scigliano, The Supreme Court and the Presidency 183–84 (Samuel Krislov
ed., 1971); see also Cordray & Cordray, supra note 134, at 1324, 1335–37 (calculating a 60–
70% win rate overall for the Solicitor General, and a 70–80% win rate for the Solicitor
General as amicus, and noting that the Solicitor General operates with less burdensome
financial constraints than most private litigants).
147
For examples of Solicitor General practice in these circumstances involving agencies,
compare Devins, supra note 134, at 296–300 (describing interactions between the Solicitor
General and the EEOC); Karr, supra note 135, at 1095–96 (describing interactions between
the Solicitor General and the FEC and FTC).
148
See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 115, at 762 & n.58.
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interests of the United States in federal court.149 Granting the Rules
Committees the authority to file an amicus brief in their own names,
without the consent of the Department of Justice, would therefore
require separate statutory authorization.
Congress has, however, done so in rare instances. The Federal
Elections Commission (“FEC”), the Office of Senate Legal Counsel, and
special prosecutors appointed under the Ethics in Government Act of
1978 all have independent litigating authority in all courts,150 in part
because of potential conflicts of interest with the executive branch,151
which have arisen from time to time.152 Notably, FEC commissioners,
congressional staff, and special prosecutors—much like the Rules
Committees—do not serve at the pleasure of the President.153
The FEC and special prosecutors are somewhat obvious cases
because of the likelihood of direct conflicts with the President. The
Office of Senate Legal Counsel is a bit different. Congress has
authorized the Senate Legal Counsel to intervene or appear as amicus on
behalf of the whole Senate, Senate committees or subcommittees, or
individual members in any legal action “in which the powers and
responsibilities of Congress under the Constitution of the United States
are placed in issue” and when “directed to do so by a resolution adopted
by the Senate.”154 The position of Senate Legal Counsel is filled by the
president pro tempore of the Senate and by a resolution of the Senate;
the Counsel is accountable to members of the leadership of both political
parties.155
Not to be left out, the House of Representatives has created an Office
of General Counsel to provide legal assistance and representation to the
149
28 U.S.C. § 516 (2012) (“Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of
litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested,
and securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the
direction of the Attorney General.”).
150
2 U.S.C. § 288d(a) (2012); I.R.C. §§ 9010, 9040 (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 594; 52 U.S.C. §
30107(a)(6) (Supp. II 2015).
151
See Devins, supra note 134, at 274.
152
See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 425 U.S. 946 (1976) (denying executive officials leave to
intervene when the FEC was already a party).
153
Devins, supra note 134, at 287–88.
154
2 U.S.C. §§ 288e(a), 288b(c).
155
2 U.S.C. §§ 288(a), 288a(a).
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House and whose positions are appointed by the House Speaker, and
Congress by statute has permitted the House General Counsel to make
appearances in federal court.156 The Bipartisan Leadership Advisory
Group of the House authorizes filings by the House general counsel.157
Rarely, and almost always for political posturing, individual members of
the House or Senate will file amicus briefs on their own.158
The House and Senate counsels defend members of Congress in
lawsuits against them related to their official business and have
represented Congress’s interests in other cases, such as in defending or
challenging the constitutionality of the line-item veto, the independentcounsel statute, and qui tam statutes.159 Yet perhaps because the Solicitor
General is a far superior Supreme Court advocate, the houses rarely
participate in cases.160
Rarity is an argument for a grant of authority, not against it. Selfrestraint and resource constraints—features characterizing the Rules
Committees—suggest that independent litigating authority would be
used only when necessary. And because only the Solicitor General may
file amicus briefs without the Court’s consent,161 the Court could also act
as a check against excessive Rules Committee amicus practice. At the
same time, the argument for authority is consistent with the spirit of
amicus briefs: to give courts more information and therefore a higher
likelihood of reaching the right result.162

156

R. H. Rep. II.8; 2 U.S.C. § 5571(a).
Frost, supra note 41, at 944.
158
See Rorie L. Spill Solberg & Eric S. Heberlig, Communicating to the Courts and
Beyond: Why Members of Congress Participate as Amici Curiae, 29 Legis. Stud. Q. 591,
607 (2004).
159
Frost, supra note 41, at 945 & n.164.
160
See id. at 945 n.168 (finding that, as of July 2011, the Senate counsel participated in
only fourteen Supreme Court cases since the Senate counsel’s creation); Eric Heberlig &
Rorie Spill, Congress at Court: Members of Congress as Amicus Curiae, 28 Se. Pol. Rev.
189, 194–95, 202–05 (2000) (surmising that house counsels’ amicus briefs are both
infrequent (approximately eight per Term) and of modest success (48% win rate) because
they lack the reputational prestige of the Solicitor General, who often is litigating for the
other side).
161
See Sup. Ct. R. 37.4; Karr, supra note 135, at 1093 & n.70.
162
See Lee Epstein, Interest Group Litigation During the Rehnquist Court Era, 9 J.L. &
Pol. 639, 641, 643 (1993); cf. Frost, supra note 41, at 965 (using this argument to make the
case for more congressional amicus briefs).
157

COPYRIGHT © 2018 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2018]

Amicus Role for Rules Committees?

33

There are downsides, of course, to the strong form of amicus
authority. Despite its likely infrequency, the strong form of amicus
authority would intrude upon the function of the Solicitor General to
formulate and execute a coordinated, long-term litigation strategy for the
United States.163 Equally troubling is that the strong form would require
the Rules Committees to exercise ongoing oversight and substantial
judgment in implementing its amicus authority. Such oversight and
judgment would demand greater resources to monitor cases and issues,
would alter the focus of the Rules Committees from exclusive ex ante
rulemaking to some consideration of ex post adjudication and rule
interpretation, and could open the Rules Committees up to charges of
politicization in its choice of cases in which to participate. It is unclear if
the Rules Committees would even want such authority.
3. Hybrid Forms: Conditional Amicus Authority
Hybrid forms of Rules Committee amicus participation could require
the weak form but give the Rules Committees filing authority only under
certain limited and specified conditions, such as in one or some
combination of the following: (a) when the Solicitor General acts
contrary to the Rules Committees, such as if the Solicitor General
declines to file an amicus brief or asserts a rule-interpretation position
that the Rules Committees dispute; (b) the Supreme Court invites the
Rules Committees to submit an amicus brief; or (c) the validity or
constitutionality of a rule is called into question.
Hybrid forms could use any combination of these three conditions.
The most limited hybrid form of amicus authority would grant the Rules
Committees independent amicus authority only when all three
conditions are met. The most relaxed form would grant authority when
any one condition is met. Other combinations populate the range
between the most limited and the most relaxed.
These hybrid forms would preserve the ability of the Rules
Committees to offer an unfiltered voice where necessary while
minimizing the encroachment into the prerogatives of the Solicitor
General. And by specifying the conditions, the hybrid forms would take
some of the decision making burden off of the Rules Committees. These
163

See Ronald S. Chamberlain, Mixing Politics and Justice: The Office of Solicitor
General, 4 J.L. & Pol. 379, 395–96 (1987).
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hybrid-form conditions, each of which is discussed in more detail below,
have established analogues in other areas of the law, though the unique
status of the Rules Committees complicates the analogies in some
instances.
a. Conflicts with the Solicitor General
Conflicts with the Solicitor General can arise if the Solicitor General
declines to file an amicus brief, already represents the United States as a
party, or files an amicus brief that takes positions that the Rules
Committees disclaim.
Some independent agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission,
can represent themselves at the Supreme Court if the Solicitor General
refuses to litigate on their behalf.164 Other agencies have similar
power,165 and, in the past, the Supreme Court has appointed counsel to
represent Congress to defend the constitutionality of a statute in the face
of a refusal by the Solicitor General to do so.166
For reasons that are unclear, the Solicitor General often declines to
file amicus briefs in major cases implicating rule interpretation. The
Solicitor General did not file a brief in, for example, Krupski v. Costa
Crociere S.p.A,167 an important case on the interpretation of Rule 15(c),
which governs the relation-back of amendments to pleadings. Nor did
the Solicitor General file a brief in Dukes, Amchem Products v. Windsor,
or Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co., three
of the biggest Rule 23 cases the Court has decided in the last twenty
years. Shady Grove is a particularly egregious example because the
validity of Rule 23 itself was at stake in the case, and the Court’s
resolution of Rule 23’s validity hinged on the scope and interpretation of

164

See Karr, supra note 135, at 1085.
See Devins, supra note 134, at 264; cf. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675,
2712–14 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group
(“BLAG”) had authority to defend the Defense of Marriage Act on appeal on behalf of
Congress when the Justice Department refused to do so).
166
See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 57, 176 (1926) (appointing Senator
George Wharton Pepper to argue on behalf of Congress when the Solicitor General refused
to defend the constitutionality of a federal statute restricting the President’s power to remove
the Postmaster General).
167
560 U.S. 538 (2010).
165
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Rule 23.168 Nor did the Solicitor General file an amicus brief in Semtek
International v. Lockheed Martin Corp., in which the Court hinted that a
particular construction of Rule 41 might be invalid under the Rules
Enabling Act.169 It is hard to imagine that the Rules Committees would
have had nothing useful to add to the Court’s consideration of those
cases in the absence of the participation of the Solicitor General.
Of course, a large part of the Solicitor General’s participation is direct
representation of the United States when it is a party to the litigation,
and, in those cases, the Solicitor General obviously would not file an
amicus brief. When those cases involve rule interpretation, the conflict
between the interests of the judiciary and the interests of the government
as a litigant is acute, and the Court could benefit from the more neutral,
objective views of the Rules Committees, even if—and perhaps
especially if—those views are in contrast with the position of the
Solicitor General.
Conflicts could arise even when the Solicitor General chooses to file
an amicus brief. The Solicitor General could take a position in the brief
that the Rules Committees dispute. In such circumstances involving
agencies, the Solicitor General sometimes—though not always—
acknowledges the disagreement in its brief or authorizes the agency to
file a brief staking out its own position.170 The Rules Committees could
have a similar option in such circumstances. If their positions are not
portrayed to their satisfaction in the Solicitor General’s brief, then they
could have the authority to file their own amicus brief so that the issues
are fully and fairly aired for the Court.
b. Amicus Invitations by the Court
The Court regularly invites participation from outside entities. Often,
the outside entity for whose views the Court calls is the Solicitor
General. But the Court occasionally—about twice per Term under Chief
Justice John Roberts—invites amicus participation from those other than
168

Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 398 (2010); id. at
446–47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
169
531 U.S. 497, 503 (2001).
170
Devins, supra note 134, at 277, 289–302. In some ways, this can enhance the Solicitor
General’s credibility, just as not hiding contrary precedent enhances any litigant’s
credibility. Id. at 277.
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the Solicitor General, typically to defend the decision below when no
party wishes to defend it or to argue for a lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.171 The Court has no official rules on when or whom it
invites,172 but the justification is to ensure “adversarial presentation of all
legal issues the court deems pertinent.”173
Inviting an amicus brief from the Rules Committees is somewhat
different. It is less about ensuring adversarial presentation on an issue
necessary to the resolution of the case and much more about apprising
the Court of key information relevant to rule interpretation.174 In this
respect, an invitation to the Rules Committees would be more like a call
for the views of the Solicitor General, though the Court usually makes
such invitations at the certiorari stage,175 or the views of interested states,
which the Court has invited a number of times.176
The Court might wish to invite the Rules Committees to participate at
the merits stage if, for example, the Rules Committees can offer useful
expertise that the Solicitor General cannot, if the United States is already
a party, or if partisan views of the executive branch are likely to
dominate the Solicitor General’s presentation. The Court might conclude
that neutral and expert Rules Committee participation can offer more
defensible cover than Solicitor General participation in particularly
controversial rules cases that may affect the Court’s institutional
legitimacy.177

171
Katherine Shaw, Friends of the Court: Evaluating the Supreme Court’s Amicus
Invitations, 101 Cornell L. Rev. 1533, 1535, 1551, 1565–68 (2016).
172
Id. at 1535 (“[T]here is no official guidance on when the Court will invite such an
amicus, whom it will invite, how it makes its selections, or the precise nature of the amicus’s
mandate.”).
173
Neal Devins & Saikrishna B. Prakash, Reverse Advisory Opinions, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev.
859, 889 (2013).
174
See Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 Duke L.J. 447, 465–67, 516–17
(2009).
175
The Solicitor General does not need the Court’s invitation or permission to file an
amicus brief. See Sup. Ct. R. 37.4.
176
See James C. Ho, Defending Texas: The Office of the Solicitor General, 29 Rev. Litig.
471, 478, 478–79 nn.23–25 (2010).
177
See Roy B. Flemming & B. Dan Wood, The Public and the Supreme Court: Individual
Justice Responsiveness to American Policy Moods, 41 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 468, 494 (1997)
(describing the Court’s interest in such cover).
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For their parts, the Solicitor General and the Rules Committees might
prefer such an arrangement. Participation upon invitation by the Court—
essentially releasing the Rules Committees from the burden of deciding
when to participate in a case—is likely to be seen as less political to the
Rules Committees and less intrusive into the Solicitor General’s
prerogatives. The Solicitor General, meanwhile, might prefer to have the
Rules Committees shoulder some of the workload in such cases so that it
can focus on core political-branch efforts and presidential agendas.
c. Questions of Validity or Constitutionality
Arguably the most important issue for any federal rule is its validity
under the Enabling Act and under the Constitution. The Rules
Committees today take seriously the limits of their rulemaking authority
and often decline to propose rules of questionable validity.178 When a
federal rule is challenged on validity grounds, the Rules Committees
could have valuable information to share with the Court. The Rules
Committees house the experts; they can offer insights into the intended
scope of a rule and the likely implications of that scope.
The Department of Justice has an interest in defending the validity of
a federal rule when it is a neutral observer. But it is institutionally less
capable than the Rules Committees of offering useful information on
questions of rule validity to the Court. Further, the Department of Justice
is not always a neutral observer. In criminal cases, the United States is a
party litigant seeking a particular result—a conviction—in the specific
case. It has the same goal in a variety of civil suits in which the United
States is a party litigant or is likely to be a party litigant in the future. In
such cases in which the validity of a rule is questioned, the Department
of Justice may not fairly represent the views of the Rules Committees
and the interests of the courts, especially if the Department of Justice is
the party challenging, or agrees with the party challenging, the rule’s
validity. And, as mentioned above, the Solicitor General frequently

178
See Burbank, supra note 14, at 1078–79. Further back, the Committees’ record is
mixed. See Stephen B. Burbank, Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul Carrington’s
“Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 Duke L.J. 1012, 1038 n.163
(book review) (arguing that the rulemakers have “not always been keenly aware of” their
limits (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted)).
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declines to file an amicus brief at all in cases in which the Court
confronts a question of rule validity.179
In related circumstances, the Court has held that when the Department
of Justice agrees that a statute is unconstitutional or declines to defend it,
“Congress is the proper party to defend [its] validity.”180 In INS v.
Chadha, for example, the Court addressed the constitutionality of the
legislative veto, an issue on which the President and Congress had
divergent interests.181 Because the Department of Justice was
challenging Congress’s use of the veto, Congress entered an appearance
through both houses’ counsels to defend the veto’s constitutionality.182
Likewise, in Bob Jones University v. United States,183 the Reagan
Administration decided to support Bob Jones’s challenge to the IRS
policy of denying tax breaks to racially discriminatory private schools,
and so the Court appointed a “counsel adversary” to defend the IRS’s
policy.184
These analogues line up imperfectly with challenges to the validity of
the federal rules. Chadha and Bob Jones arose from inter- and
intrabranch conflicts with the government as a litigant in both cases,
necessitating the need for divided-government participation to ensure
adversarial presentation of the issues. Nevertheless, the similarities
suggest that the Rules Committees should play a role in such cases. The
aggrieved parties in these cases were Congress and the IRS.185 Congress,
after all, has an interest in ensuring that the policies it enacts into law are
found constitutional; agencies have an interest in ensuring that the
policies they promulgate by regulation and action are found valid and
constitutional.
The same could be said for the Rules Committees: they promulgate
procedural policy through the federal rules, with the ex ante
179

See supra text accompanying notes 167–69.
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940 (1983).
181
Id. at 952–58.
182
See Charles Tiefer, The Senate and House Counsel Offices: Dilemmas of Representing
in Court the Institutional Congressional Client, 61 Law & Contemp. Probs. 47, 52 (1998).
183
461 U.S. 574 (1983).
184
Devins, supra note 134, at 276.
185
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 931 (“When an agency of the United States is a party to a case in
which the Act of Congress it administers is held unconstitutional, it is an aggrieved party for
purposes of taking an appeal . . . .”).
180
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predictability that the rules provide. The Rules Committees take their
limits seriously; when they propose a rule, they have vetted it against the
possibility of invalidity, especially considering the intended scope of the
rule to avoid conflict with the Rules Enabling Act. The Rules
Committees therefore have functional and institutional reasons for
ensuring that their rules are found valid and constitutional. Like
Congress in the context of a statute and an agency in the context of its
regulations, the Rules Committees can be seen as “aggrieved parties” to
a validity challenge to a federal rule and thus should have a voice in its
defense.
The Court currently employs an avoidance canon when interpreting
rules: it will interpret a rule to be valid under the Rules Enabling Act if
that interpretation is possible.186 The premise justifying the presumption
is well grounded in many instances because the rulemaking process,
with its deliberate study and layers of inter- and intrabranch checks,
makes it unlikely that a promulgated rule, properly interpreted, will
transgress the limits of the Rules Enabling Act.187 But the reasoning is
circular in instances in which the Rules Committees have proposed rules
close to the limits of the Rules Enabling Act on the understanding that
the Supreme Court will hold the rule invalid if the rule exceeds its
limits.188 And the Court’s use of the avoidance canon has led to some
strained interpretations of the rules.189
Whatever its virtues, the avoidance canon is no substitute for Rules
Committee amicus participation. Information from the Rules
Committees useful to validity questions can actually be provided rather
than presumed. Perhaps that information would support the soundness of
safe constructions of the rule in question. Or perhaps that information
would undermine the soundness of alternative constructions of the rule
186

See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic, 559 U.S. at 405–06; Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503–04;
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 842, 845 (1999). For more, see Struve, supra note
16, at 1147–52 (discussing the motivation for and the potential problems of using the
avoidance canon in rule interpretation).
187
See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) (stating that a court can refuse to
apply a federal rule “only if the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their
prima facie judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling
Act nor constitutional restrictions”).
188
See Burbank, supra note 14, at 1178–79.
189
See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Semtek, Forum Shopping and Federal Common Law, 77
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1027, 1039–42 (2002); Struve, supra note 16, at 1151–52.
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in question, forcing the Court to consider other constructions or confront
the validity question head-on.190 Perhaps the Rules Committees would
confess error and agree that a rule should be held invalid, thereby taking
some of the pressure off of the Court to reach a contrary decision.191 Or
perhaps the Rules Committees would explain that the rule was drafted
without any understanding about its validity in the expectation that the
Court would resolve the question. Any such information would be useful
to the Court, and would lead to more honest decision making than
reliance on the generalized assumptions of the avoidance canon.
D. Content
The previous Section focused on the amicus role and explored some
norms for deciding when and how the Rules Committees should
participate. A separate but related question is what norms the Rules
Committees should follow when deciding what informational content to
provide in an amicus brief.
The views called for naturally will depend upon the circumstances of
the case and the particular rule at stake, and the sound discretion of the
Rules Committees should guide decisions about content. But, in general,
certain categories of content seem particularly important for ruleinterpretation cases.
First, and perhaps most usefully, if the Court’s interpretation will
depend upon “legislative facts” like discovery expense or judicialmanagement issues, the Rules Committees could offer information on
how the rules work in the lower courts.192 The Rules Committees,
charged with continuous study of the rules, engage in regular

190

See Burbank, supra note 189, at 1042–46 (revealing that Rule 41(b)’s rulemaking
materials contradict the Court’s interpretation of the rule).
191
See Talk Am. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 67–68 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Order of Jan. 21, 1963, 374 U.S. 865, 870 (1963) (Black & Douglas, JJ.)
(acknowledging “the embarrassment of having to sit in judgment on . . . rules which we have
approved and which as applied in given situations might have to be declared invalid”). The
Court has the gumption to declare its own actions unconstitutional—it once held invalid its
own General Order in Bankruptcy No. 8 as exceeding its rulemaking authority under the
Bankruptcy Act. See Meek v. Ctr. Cty. Banking Co., 268 U.S. 426, 434 (1925).
192
For background on “legislative” facts as contrasted with “adjudicative” facts, see
Kenneth Culp Davis, Facts in Lawmaking, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 931, 940–41 (1980), and
Kenneth Culp Davis, Official Notice, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 537, 549 (1949).
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deliberations, commission surveys and empirical studies, and solicit the
input of the bench and bar. They are a far more reliable source of useful
information from which the Court can make legislative factfinding than
anecdotal evidence, outside sources, partisan presentation by the parties,
amici, or the Department of Justice, or the Court’s own intuition,193 as
Twombly amply illustrates.194
Second, the Rules Committees can inform the Court when it is
considering changes to rules currently at issue in a case.195 Possible rule
amendment could be reason for the Court to deny certiorari in a case or,
if it has already granted certiorari, dismiss the writ as improvidently
granted. It also could signal to the Court that the issue is one better
resolved in the first instance by the rulemaking process rather than by
case adjudication.196
193

See Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Lawmaking: A
Proposed Research Service for the Supreme Court, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 9–11 (1986) (arguing
that the Court is ill equipped to obtain evidence for proper legislative factfinding); Mulligan
& Staszewski, supra note 9, at 1218 (pointing to “the institutional advantages of rulemaking
in collecting legislative facts”).
194
See supra text accompanying notes 80–87.
195
The Standing Committee has communicated such information to Congress when
Congress was considering legislation that overlapped with the Rules Committees’ agendas.
See, e.g., Letter from the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure to the Honorable
Henry J. Hyde (Apr. 21, 1997), in Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, Agenda Book for Oct.
6–7, 1997, at Agenda Item VI, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agendabooks/advisory-committee-rules-civil-procedure-october-1997
[https://perma.cc/4LEJPDTB] (urging the House to reject a proposed statutory amendment to a Federal Rule of
Evidence because the Advisory Committee had placed the issue on its next meeting’s
agenda, and refusing to take a position on an offer-of-judgment statutory provision but
nevertheless offering advice about problems the Committee encountered); Letter from the
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure to the Honorable Orrin G. Hatch (Apr. 29,
1997), in Agenda Book, supra, at Agenda Item VI (urging the Senate regarding the same).
196
In Amchem Products v. Windsor, for example, the Court took note of a committee
proposal to overrule the very circuit decision under review in Amchem, but assumed that the
proposal would not go forward because many of the public comments “were opposed to, or
skeptical of, the amendment,” and so the Court promulgated its own incomplete test that
declined to reach the extent of the Advisory Committee’s proposal. 521 U.S. 591, 618–21
(1997). The awkward timing of the decision threw the Advisory Committee into some
disarray about how to proceed, with some members “urg[ing] that simple adherence to the
committee’s published proposal would be unwise” because “there is great risk that
inconsistencies may exist between what the Court intended and what the amended rule might
come to mean.” Draft Minutes of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee at 32, in Agenda
Book of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee (1998). Although the Advisory Committee
recognized that Amchem was both different from and less drastic than the Advisory
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Third, the Rules Committees could offer information relevant to rule
interpretation of which the Court may not be aware and which the
parties cannot or do not provide. For example, because the Court and
parties are focused on the particular facts of the case and the particular
rules at stake in some isolation, the Rules Committees could offer
broader perspectives on how particular interpretations proffered by the
parties might affect other cases or other rules. Antitrust class actions, for
example, present very different concerns and pressures than more runof-the-mine cases, and how the rules operate in a big antitrust or classaction case may overwhelm consideration of how the rules operate in
less extreme cases. The Rules Committees could remind the Court of
those differences and the potential effects of construing transsubstantive
rules. Likewise, the Rules Committees could offer the historical context
of the origins of the rule and whether the bases, policies, and
justifications for those origins continue in force today.197 If the validity
or constitutionality of a rule is challenged, the Rules Committees might
be able to provide information about the rule’s intended scope.198 If the
Court is considering overruling or altering a prior interpretation of a

Committee’s proposal, see Amchem: First Thoughts, in Agenda Book, supra note 195, at
Agenda Item V(B) (“The Court notes, but does not reach, additional problems presented by
the Amchem case itself . . . . If rule provisions are to be proposed for measuring the impact
of settlement on the calculus of Rule 23(a) and (b), they must be generated out of sources
other than the Court’s opinion.”), the Advisory Committee ultimately abandoned further
rulemaking on the matter, see Draft Minutes of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee at 32, in
Agenda Book of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee (1998). It is worth pointing out that
the decision has been criticized as being “difficult to square with” Rule 23 and the
accompanying Advisory Committee Note. See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Class
Actions and the Counterrevolution Against Federal Litigation, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1495,
1500–01 (2017). The Solicitor General declined to file a brief in Amchem.
197
Providing reliable historical information could be tricky. Rules Committee terms are
typically three years, and it may be that, on a particular issue, the current Rules Committee
members have no special insight into the motivations or deliberations of past Rules
Committee members. Perhaps the reporters, which generally participate in rulemaking for far
longer terms, can offer a more sure-footed institutional memory, but historical questions no
doubt will arise that cannot be answered by the present Rules Committees or the
Administrative Office. Still, humility can be useful. The Court might appreciate hearing that
the current Rules Committees have no greater insight into a particular rule’s origin than the
parties.
198
Because a narrow scope is less likely to invalidate the rule, the scope of the rule is
crucial to the validity question. See Walker v. Armco Steel Co., 446 U.S. 740, 748–52
(1980).
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rule, the Rules Committees could inform the Court of any past—and
failed—attempts to amend the rule and the reasons for those attempts
and failures.199
These general norms of amicus content confine Rules Committee
participation to the neutral expertise justifying Rules Committee
participation in the first place. They help cast the Rules Committees as
true “friends of the court,” supplying useful information that perhaps
cannot be provided reliably or fully by other entities.
E. An Illustration: Sibbach
Skeptics of my proposal might consider an instance in which a
member of the Rules Committee did file an amicus brief in a case
challenging the validity of a federal rule. The case was Sibbach v.
Wilson & Co., decided by the Court in 1941.200 The district court, sitting
in diversity, had ordered the plaintiff to submit to a physical examination
under Rule 35, a discovery rule of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
She refused, and the district court ordered the contempt sanction of
imprisonment under Rule 37, a sanctions provision for discovery-rule
violations. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the sanction, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of
whether Rules 35 and 37 were valid under the Rules Enabling Act.201
Rule 35 had gained notice in Congress about possibly exceeding the
Act’s scope,202 and the case was clearly seen as a test case on the validity
of the new federal rules.203 Despite the enormity of the question
presented—whether a federal rule was invalid under the Rules Enabling
Act, a challenge reaching the Court just three years after their original
promulgation—the Solicitor General declined to file an amicus brief.

199

Cf. Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 9, at 1218 (noting that this circumstance calls
for rulemaking rather than adjudication).
200
312 U.S. 1 (1941).
201
Id. at 6–7.
202
See Burbank, supra note 14, at 1176 (discussing how questions of the Advisory
Committee’s rulemaking power with respect to Rule 35 “attracted attention and prompted
questions and discussion in Congress”).
203
See id. at 1181 n.718 (“In fact, Sibbach was a test case from the beginning.”).
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Only one amicus brief was filed: by the Chairman of the Advisory
Committee, William D. Mitchell.204 His brief raised the essential
argument, left unargued by the parties, that the federal rules at issue did
not authorize the particular sanction imposed in the case.205 That issue
was critical because the question on which the Court granted certiorari—
whether Rules 35 and 37 were valid under the Rules Enabling Act—was
itself dependent upon the assumption that the rules could be used the
way the lower courts used them.206 If, as Mitchell argued, the rules did
not authorize the sanction at issue, then the question of their validity
should be analyzed differently or perhaps avoided entirely.207
Mitchell argued that, in fact, the rules do not allow imprisonment for
contempt for violation of a Rule 35 order.208 Quoting the text, Mitchell
emphasized that Rule 35 provides for no sanction, and Rule 37’s
physical-coercion provisions expressly exclude Rule 35 enforcement.209
Further, Mitchell pointed out, “the record of the proceedings of the
Advisory Committee” confirm this reading of the text,210 and Mitchell
attached as an appendix the drafts considered by the Advisory
Committee and the reporter’s transcript from the deliberations on
them.211 This narrower reading of the rules helped Mitchell’s argument
that, as true “rules of practice and procedure,” they were within the

204
Brief for William D. Mitchell as Amicus Curiae, Sibbach, 312 U.S. 1 (No. 28), 1940
WL 46492. It appears that Mitchell filed the brief in his own name because, at the time, the
Advisory Committee was inactive, but the brief clearly carried the weight of his office.
205
Id. at 3 (“So far as the record shows, it seems to have been assumed by the parties and
by the courts below that physical coercion of the petitioner by imprisonment for contempt is
provided for in the rules.”).
206
Id. at 8 (“The question as to the validity of the rules should not be determined on the
assumption that they authorize any physical coercion by imprisonment or otherwise to
enforce an order for physical examination. They expressly prohibit resort to such means.”).
207
Id. at 24 (recognizing that the Court could “have the judgment reversed on the narrow
ground that contempt proceedings are unauthorized, without a decision on the question of the
validity of the rule authorizing physical examinations”). Mitchell nevertheless argued against
this narrow ground, calling it “unfortunate, not only for both parties to this cause, but from
the standpoint of the public interest” to avoid the question of the rules’ validity. Id.
208
Id. at 7.
209
Id. at 8–9.
210
Id. at 10.
211
Id. at 10–12.
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scope of the Rules Enabling Act even if they had some effect on
substantive rights.212
As for remedies, Mitchell argued that the Court should clarify “that
the rule does not authorize arrest or physical compulsion,”213 and he
suggested that the Court, if it holds the rules valid, should nevertheless
“order the judgment of commitment for contempt vacated on the ground
that contempt proceedings are not authorized by Rule 37.”214
Mitchell’s position that the rules did not authorize the contempt
sanction in the first place, if correct, would have been a victory for the
petitioner, but she had not pressed the argument prior to his brief. In a
brief responding to Mitchell’s argument, she informed the Court that the
reason she had not pressed the argument was that she did not know
about the Advisory Committee materials before Mitchell appended them
to his brief, and that she reasonably read the rules to authorize the
contempt sanction issued by the district court.215 Faced with Mitchell’s
brief, she acknowledged her “interest[] in having the court determine
that she need not submit to a physical examination” and consented to the
remedy suggested by Mitchell.216
Mitchell’s brief no doubt aided the Court. The Court relied upon the
materials that Mitchell appended to his brief, tracked his argument that
the rules did not authorize the district court’s order of contempt, and
followed Mitchell’s suggestion of vacating the contempt order.217
Sibbach was a watershed moment for the future validity of the
rules,218 and, as such, it was a unique case. And its statutory
212

Id. at 15–16.
Id. at 25.
214
Id.
215
Reply to Brief of Respondent and to Brief of William D. Mitchell as Amicus Curiae at
5–6, Sibbach, 312 U.S. 1 (No. 28), 1910 WL 21011 [hereinafter Reply Brief]. But cf.
Burbank, supra note 14, at 1181 n.718 (“Sibbach was a test case from the beginning. The
trial judge entered a contempt order to assist Sibbach’s counsel in challenging the validity of
Rule 35. Moreover, both parties deliberately chose not to raise the Rule 37 question so as to
present the ‘real question.’”).
216
Reply Brief, supra note 215, at 6.
217
See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 16.
218
See Burbank, supra note 14, at 1032–34 (“[T]he Court reminds us of Congress’s power
under the Constitution to regulate federal practice and procedure, interprets ‘procedure’
broadly for that purpose, and fails to suggest any limitations on the Court under the Rules
Enabling Act that are more restrictive than the limitations on Congress . . . .”).
213
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interpretation of the Rules Enabling Act has been roundly criticized.219
But these aspects of Sibbach do not detract from the useful role that the
Advisory Committee chairman played. His brief filled a gap left open by
the parties and the absence of the Solicitor General, offered information
within the competence of the Rules Committees on the scope of the rules
in question, provided difficult-to-obtain documentation about the
Advisory Committee’s deliberations, and suggested arguments useful to
the Court. Whatever one thinks of the statutory-interpretation portion of
the opinion in Sibbach, Mitchell’s brief can be seen as a useful and
successful aid to the Court’s rule-interpretation analysis.
F. Mechanics
Sibbach was decided in an era when rulemaking was more flexible
and less transparent.220 The changes to the rulemaking structure since
1958 have imposed additional layers and more formality to the
process.221 Today’s rulemaking structure is built for the deliberative,
pervasive, objective, and predictive business of rulemaking, not the
unified, episodic, positional, and evaluative business of legal advocacy.
This Section thus considers the mechanics of an amicus practice in light
of the current structure.
Who should represent the Rules Committees? The Judicial
Conference could appoint a “counsel” to the Standing Committee or to
each Advisory Committee to perform necessary advocacy functions.
Such a counsel would have the advantage of gaining a firsthand
knowledge of the business of the Rules Committee and the workings of
the rules.
But the position also would suffer from several significant
disadvantages. The most troubling would be the control of the Chief
Justice, who appoints all members of the Standing and Advisory

219
See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic, 559 U.S. at 411–14 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion)
(“Sibbach’s exclusive focus on the challenged Federal Rule—driven by the very real concern
that Federal Rules which vary from State to State would be chaos, . . . is hard to square with
§ 2072(b)’s terms.”); Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the
Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 17, 27–31 (2010).
220
See Struve, supra note 16, at 1103–09.
221
Id.
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Committees.222 Some commentators already bemoan the risk of political
partisanship that the Chief Justice’s appointment power entails.223 If the
Chief Justice also directly appoints the principal advocate for the Rules
Committees, then whatever partisanship exists at the rulemaking stage
will be exacerbated at the adjudicative stage. Other disadvantages
include cost (the addition of a new membership seat or the displacement
of an existing membership seat), the dual role of rulemaker and advocate
that such a membership position would entail, the rotating nature of the
counsel if the position is subject to the normal three-year term, and the
incentives of such a position to aggressively assert the role of and
powers of that office.
A better solution would use the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, an entity created by Congress in 1939 to provide
administrative support to the federal judiciary.224 Included within the
Administrative Office is its Office of the General Counsel, which
provides legal counsel and services to the Administrative Office and to
the Judicial Conference and helps support the rulemaking process.225
The Director of the Administrative Office hires the General Counsel and
Assistant Directors, and, as the Director’s delegates, those officers hire
career staff attorneys, including, currently, three line attorneys
specifically to assist the Rules Committees.226 Currently, the attorneys’
support consists of providing research and administrative assistance,
much as a judicial clerk for a judge, but the statute appears to permit the

222
See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2012) (specifying that the Chief Justice appoints the members of
the Standing Committee); About the Judicial Conference, U.S. Courts, http://www.uscourts.
gov/about-federal-courts/governance-judicial-conference/about-judicial-conference [https://
perma.cc/SNS7-9FDL] (“The Chief Justice has sole authority to make committee
appointments.”).
223
See infra text accompanying note 260.
224
28 U.S.C. §§ 601–612.
225
In Profile: The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts – Annual Report 2015, U.S.
Courts,
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/profile-administrative-office-us-courtsannual-report-2015 [https://perma.cc/GPK8-4SWF].
226
28 U.S.C. § 602(d) (giving the Director authority to delegate his hiring authority to
other AO personnel); id. § 604(a) (granting the Director hiring authority); Interview with
John Rabiej, supra note 13.
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Judicial Conference to authorize and instruct the General Counsel to
take on an advocacy role.227
Locating the Rules Committees’ advocacy function in the
Administrative Office’s Office of General Counsel capitalizes on
existing mechanisms and competencies. The Office of General Counsel
attorneys already gain firsthand knowledge of Rules Committee business
because they work closely with the Rules Committees. They are career
attorneys with the neutrality that comes from governmental service and
distance from political (or Chief Justice) appointment.228 Some increased
burden would attend taking on an amicus role, but, as the previous
Sections in this Part demonstrate, most involvement is likely to be
limited to specific contexts, the information is largely already in the
hands of the Rules Committees and the Administrative Office, and
participation would be through consultation or briefs without oral
argument.
Granting the Administrative Office’s General Counsel authority to
represent the Rules Committees formally before the Supreme Court
would, however, require congressional authorization. Currently, the
Administrative Office’s attorneys are statutorily disabled from
“engag[ing] directly or indirectly in the practice of law in any court of
the United States.”229 It would be a simple amendment for Congress,
however, to grant the General Counsel in this section a limited courtappearance authority for the purpose of representing the Rules
Committees, in an amicus capacity, before the Supreme Court in
specified circumstances. Indeed, such an amendment would also
supersede any concerns about the limitations of the Rules Enabling Act
on Rules Committee amicus participation and any concerns about
encroachment into the Department of Justice’s statutory prerogative.

227
28 U.S.C. § 604(a)(24) (granting the Judicial Conference authority to assign other
unspecified duties to the Director).
228
They are also removed from control by the Judicial Conference. See About the Judicial
Conference: Membership, U.S. Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/
governance-judicial-conference/about-judicial-conference
[https://perma.cc/SNS7-9FDL]
(“Judicial Conference committees . . . are policy-advisory entities and are not involved in
making day-to-day management decisions for the United States courts or for the
Administrative Office.”).
229
28 U.S.C. § 607.
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Once statutory authority is granted, who would authorize any amicus
filing and how might information be communicated effectively? The
Judicial Conference should be able to develop effective procedures for
the amicus role I propose. The details of any procedures would require
the balancing of considerations internal to the judiciary and the bodies
participating, but some general schematics seem straightforward. For
consultation on an amicus brief filed by the Solicitor General, the
Administrative Office attorneys should communicate directly with the
Solicitor General’s office based on information obtained from the
Advisory Committees, the Federal Judicial Center, and any other
relevant materials, without further involvement from the Judicial
Conference or Standing Committee. For the filing of an amicus brief, the
Standing Committee should authorize the Administrative Office
attorneys to file a brief, while the relevant Advisory Committee, a
subcommittee, or the reporter, along with the Federal Judicial Center,
should consult on its content.
To be sure, independent amicus filings would require instituting
internal procedures that significantly depart from the normal rulemaking
structure. Currently, the Judicial Conference, the Standing Committee,
and the Advisory Committees typically meet only twice a year in a
staggered format to allow for the required layers of rulemaking
review.230 Review takes months—longer than the speed required for an
effective amicus practice, even if that amicus practice is infrequent.
Thus, the procedures for filing an amicus brief would require sporadic
ad hoc meetings of Advisory Committee members and fewer layers of
review.
These procedures, however, seem workable. Subcommittees of the
Advisory Committees regularly meet by teleconference more often than
twice a year, and it seems a stretch to say that effective participation by
the relevant Advisory Committee in the drafting of an amicus brief by
Administrative Office attorneys would be unreasonably difficult.
230
See About the Judicial Conference: Membership, U.S. Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov
/about-federal-courts/governance-judicial-conference/about-judicial-conference
(“Traditionally, the Chief Justice has called the annual meeting in September and a semiannual session in March.”); Open Meetings and Hearings of the Rules Committee, U.S.
Courts,
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/open-meetingsand-hearings-rules-committee [https://perma.cc/43UE-TKUH] (scheduling staggered
meetings of the Standing Committee and the Advisory Committees).
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Further, because amicus practice is not rulemaking, it need not follow
the statutory rulemaking-review structure, and nothing prevents the
Judicial Conference from streamlining the process for amicus practice.
The Judicial Conference could, for example, grant the Standing
Committee the power to authorize an amicus filing and direct the
relevant Advisory Committee, or a subcommittee, to assist in developing
the content of any authorized brief without further review by the
Standing Committee or Judicial Conference.231
III. ALTERNATIVES AND OBJECTIONS
This Part anticipates and addresses possible alternatives and
objections to my proposal for Rules Committee participation in an
amicus practice. It focuses on the following: that participation is
unnecessary in light of existing materials, that the Rules Committees are
not institutionally up to the task, that the Rules Committees will resist
the role, and that intrabranch advocacy presents structural concerns.
A. Sufficient Existing Materials
This objection challenges the need for a Rules Committee amicus role
by pointing to the wealth of materials, tools, and mechanisms available
to the Court. The parties are there to press arguments, presumably some
arguments that the Rules Committees would make. When the parties do
not, amici can. When amici do not, the Court can use traditional legal
research to find reputable sources such as public Rules Committee
materials, commentary from Advisory Committee members, and
treatises and hornbooks. When such materials still provide a shaky
answer, the Supreme Court can deploy tools to avoid speculative
reasoning, such as by denying certiorari or dismissing a writ as
improvidently granted or issuing a narrow opinion. Why, the objection
goes, aren’t these already sufficient to address my concerns?
The answer is that they do in many cases, but they don’t in a few.
And those few—like Twombly and Dukes—are likely to be the crucial
rules cases in which the views of the Rules Committees are needed
most. Rules Committee participation is a beneficial stopgap for them.
231

Similar procedures work well enough for Congress when it files an amicus brief. See
Frost, supra note 41, at 944.
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And the relative infrequency of the need for Rules Committee
participation makes the logistics of that participation more palatable, not
less.
Part II already documented some reasons why briefs by the Solicitor
General may not fully or accurately represent the Rules Committees’
views.232 It is worth pointing out here that other amici have similar
failings. For one, the Court has become skeptical of private amicus
practice, often viewing it as partisan and unhelpful.233 For another, the
sheer volume of amicus briefs in contentious cases can dilute their effect
or force the justices into biased heuristics to give credence to some over
others.234
Academic amicus briefs have more appearance of neutrality, but there
is reason to believe that the Court affords them less credibility than it
would a brief from the Rules Committees. Academics have agendas, too,
and judges often view them as disconnected from real-world practice on
the ground.235 Even procedural scholars are likely to have less
information about the particular rules at stake than the Rules
Committees, which are charged with ongoing study and are composed of
members with firsthand experience working with the rules. If there is
doubt about how the Rules Committees are expressing their views,
nothing prevents other amici, including academics, from seeking
permission to file their own briefs to voice their views.
It is true that the Court on its own can cobble together rulemaking
materials or member commentary that may be available and relevant to
the Court.236 But the Court is an imperfect researcher,237 and the

232

See supra text accompanying notes 123–42.
See supra text accompanying notes 118–21.
234
It appears, for example, that the prestige of the amicus matters. See Paul M. Collins Jr.,
Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S.
Supreme Court Litigation, 38 Law & Soc’y Rev. 807, 827 (2004). For the volume of amicus
filings, see supra text accompanying note 115.
235
See Orin S. Kerr, The Influence of Immanuel Kant on Evidentiary Approaches in 18thCentury Bulgaria, 18 Green Bag 2d 251, 251 n.1 (2015).
236
See, e.g., Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613–19 (1997) (relying on public
statements by the Advisory Committee reporter); Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S.
438, 444 (1946) (stating that the views of the Advisory Committees’ “authorized
spokesmen” deserve weight in construing the rules); cf. Marcus, supra note 20, at 965–67
(arguing that various types of Committee materials should be given weight by the Court).
233
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materials it assembles may not accurately reflect the Rules Committees’
views.238 The Rules Committees know best what materials and
information most accurately reflect the views of the Rules Committees,
and the Rules Committees can assemble and present those views far
more efficiently than the Court.
Consider, again, Twombly, probably the most important case ever on
Rule 8. The Court had before it the parties’ briefs, the amicus brief of
the Solicitor General, and a host of private amicus briefs by legal
scholars (on both sides), the American Bar Association (“ABA”) in
support of neither party, business groups such as the Chamber of
Commerce in support of petitioners, and the American Antitrust
Institution in support of respondents. And the Court’s opinion relied
upon commentaries from academics and former rulemakers like Charles
Clark and treatises like Wright & Miller.239
Despite this wealth of information, the Court lacked an authoritative
brief containing reliable information about the meaning of Rule 8, the
history of amendment proposals on and Committee study of Rule 8, the
relationship between Conley and Rule 12(e), and the empirics of
discovery costs and meritless litigation.240 Notably, no party or amicus
brief offered any data regarding discovery costs.241 Accordingly, the
Court relied on incomplete information and its own assumptions of the
way litigation and the civil rules work. A brief from the Rules
Committees could have caused the Court to write its opinion quite
differently.
B. Institutional Competence
This objection questions the efficacy of Rules Committee
participation on two fronts. One is a form of advocacy competence.
237

See Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 Va. L. Rev. 1255,
1290–300 (2012).
238
In Amchem Products v. Windsor, for example, the Court cited to the Advisory
Committee Note and Reporter Ben Kaplan’s post-adoption commentary on Rule 23,
Windsor, 521 U.S. at 613–14, but others have argued that the Court misread the Note and
questioned how representative Kaplan’s views were of the Advisory Committee as a whole,
see Burbank & Farhang, supra note 196, at 1500–01 & 1501 n.30.
239
E.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558–59, 561 n.7 (2007).
240
Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 9, at 1220.
241
Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 62, at 848.
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Unlike the Solicitor General or the elite private Supreme Court bar, the
Rules Committee and Administrative Office attorneys lack a burnished
reputation as Supreme Court advocates. Further, rulemakers approach
problems differently from advocates. The Rules Committees are neutral,
consensus-seeking experts rather than partisan advocates, and are more
attuned to prospective drafting than fact-specific application.242 As a
result, one might surmise that the Rules Committees’ participation in the
highly specialized context of Supreme Court cases will be unsuccessful.
The premise itself is suspect; Rules Committee membership is
dominated by practitioners and judges, whose usual business is
comprised of fact-specific application and court advocacy. True, few can
measure up to the high bar set by the Solicitor General and other
Supreme Court specialists. But that does not mean that Rules Committee
participation will be insufficient or ineffective. To the contrary, when
Rules Committee participation sticks to its strengths—its institutional
knowledge, neutral objectivity, and expertise—it is likely to add positive
value to the Supreme Court’s interpretive process. That should be reason
enough for an amicus role.
A second front of attack stems from a charge of institutional myopia.
The Rules Committee members are part of a relatively homogeneous
elite, which, the argument goes, causes them to focus on a narrow set of
issues or ignore run-of-the-mill problems in favor of big commercial
cases.243
I do not deny the homogeneity that dominates both the Court and the
Rules Committees. But my proposal is less beholden to homogeneity
than the alternatives. The Rules Committees and Administrative Office
attorneys are certainly no more homogeneous than the Court itself, the
private amicus participants before the Court, and the Solicitor
General.244 Indeed, there are good reasons why the Rules Committees
242
See Porter, supra note 2, at 182 (asserting that applications “would not be susceptible to
resolution through rulemaking, particularly given the lengthy, consensus-based rulemaking
process” and that “[s]uch discretionary, fact-laden questions are not within the institutional
competence of rulemakers”).
243
See generally Brooke D. Coleman, One Percent Procedure, 91 Wash. L. Rev. 1005,
1008 (2016) (arguing that the vast majority of federal and state cases are governed by a set
of rules made by and for the one-percent elite).
244
Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court:
Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 Geo. L.J. 1487, 1527–29 (2008)
(commenting on the elitism of the Supreme Court bar); Struve, supra note 16, at 1136
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are likely to press more democratic views. They are exposed to—and in
many instances are responsive to—a demographically broad range of
views during the rulemaking public-comment period. They consider the
historical work of the Rules Committees and engage in continuous study
of the rules over time and across a range of cases. And they have the
benefit of the nonpartisan studies of the Federal Judicial Center. Perhaps
more diversity on the Rules Committees would produce an even more
powerful and effective amicus practice. But whatever the membership of
the Rules Committees—homogeneous or diverse—the Rules
Committees can play an important role in offering information to the
Court that it might not otherwise have or credit.
C. Institutional Resistance
The Rules Committees themselves might resist an amicus role. Three
reasons for resistance come to mind: the limits of the Rules Enabling
Act, the appearance of partisanship, and the difficulties of representing
the views of the Rules Committees. None, in my view, justifies complete
resistance. Indeed, as I will show, the final point supports my proposal.
The Rules Committees might worry that the Rules Enabling Act, by
prescribing for the Rules Committees a rulemaking role but saying
nothing about an amicus role,245 implicitly prohibits the Rules
Committees from playing an amicus role. Yet I know of no other
statutory rulemaking authorization that has been construed to contain
such a negative inference. Agencies—even those whose statutory
mandate is directed to rulemaking—still consult with the Solicitor
General when the Solicitor General files a brief regarding the
regulations’ meaning.
Further, the Rules Enabling Act has not prevented the Rules
Committees from friendly participation before Congress. In 1997, for
example, the Standing Committee wrote letters to both the House and
Senate urging Congress to reject a proposed statutory amendment to the
Federal Rules of Evidence because the Advisory Committee had placed

(“Compared with the other rulemaking bodies, however, the Court appears less
representative, less knowledgeable, and perhaps more liable to engraft erroneous policy
choices on the Rules.”).
245
28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2012).
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the issue on its next agenda.246 In the same letter to the House, the
Standing Committee offered advice about problems the Advisory
Committee had encountered in its experience with an offer-of-judgment
rule related to legislation the House was considering.247 In the 2000s, the
Standing Committee and Advisory Committee on Civil Rules signaled
to Congress their approval of a precursor to the Class Action Fairness
Act to expand diversity jurisdiction in class actions.248 Admittedly, these
communications are not directly analogous to amicus practice, but they
at least complicate any negative inference that the Rules Enabling Act
permits only rulemaking.
Finally, the Rules Enabling Act has never been construed to prevent
individual committee members from making public statements about the
proper interpretation of the rules, and the Court has even relied on the
statements of these “authorized spokesmen” of the Advisory
Committees as proper authority.249 Given the knowledge and
information that the Rules Committees can offer, there is just no reason
to construe the Rules Enabling Act as disabling communication between
the Rules Committees and the Solicitor General.
Even were I wrong about the limits of the Rules Enabling Act, the
solution would be simple: Congress should grant the Rules Committees
amicus authorization as delineated in this Article. Some congressional
action is likely to be necessary anyway in order to authorize amicus
participation independent of the Department of Justice. Such
congressional action also would obviate any concerns about the limits of
the Rules Enabling Act.
Another reason for Committee resistance might stem from the fear of
seeming partisan or political. Yet it is hard to see how the kind of
participation articulated here would create that impression very often.
Rules Committee amicus participation in its weakest form merely offers
assistance to the Solicitor General; in its strongest form, it manifests as a
246

See supra note 195.
Letter from the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure to the Honorable Henry
J. Hyde, supra note 195.
248
See John K. Rabiej, The Making of Class Action Rule 23—What Were We Thinking?,
24 Miss. C. L. Rev. 323, 388, 390 (2005).
249
Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444 (1946); see also, e.g., Amchem
Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613–19 (1997) (relying on public writings by the Advisory
Committee reporter).
247

COPYRIGHT © 2018 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

56

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 104:1

neutral, friend-of-the-Court brief authored by career staff attorneys of
the Administrative Office. This kind of role surely is no more political
or partisan than rulemaking itself, and it is certainly less so than the
amicus practice of the Solicitor General, who is able to maintain a
plausibly neutral reputation.250
To be sure, partisanship and its appearance are possible. These
concerns may justify institutional caution (including the discretion to
decline to advocate) and careful positioning by the career attorneys of
the Administrative Office in any authored brief, just as the Rules
Committees and Administrative Office have done in public
correspondence with Congress.251 But one need not throw the baby out
with the bathwater.
A final reason for institutional resistance may be to avoid confronting
the organizational difficulties of ascribing a single position to represent
the views of a committee of individuals (and perhaps even of individuals
who are no longer on the Rules Committees). Yet this difficulty is no
less surmountable than for any other conglomeration of interests
represented by any of numerous amicus briefs filed with the Court. The
executive branch is a multimember institution with competing and
disparate interests, yet the Solicitor General is expected to speak with
one voice.252 Even the highly fractured Congress, which often has
difficulty speaking with one voice,253 can have uniform views on
institutional interests.254 The smallness of the Rules Committee
membership and the shared and largely apolitical goals of court
rulemaking suggest at least the possibility that the Rules Committees
could agree upon an acceptable position.255
Even if coming to a resolution proves difficult in certain cases, it is
better than the alternative. Currently, the Court, when it cares about
Rules Committee views, sometimes credits public statements by

250

Caplan, supra note 123, at 3–7.
See supra note 195.
252
Frost, supra note 41, at 921.
253
See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as
Oxymoron, 12 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 239, 254 (1992).
254
Frost, supra note 41, at 919.
255
Marcus, supra note 20, at 962.
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individual committee members,256 which may not accurately reflect the
views of the committee as a whole, if such a view actually even
existed.257 At the very least, Rules Committee participation could
confirm or call into question the reliability of those public statements as
indices of committee intent or rule meaning.
And the inability of the Rules Committees to come to a unified
position in a certain case is itself useful information for the Court. It may
be that, when the rule at issue was drafted, the Rules Committees lacked
a full or shared understanding of the meaning of a rule, its scope, or its
intended application in a specific case.258 Perhaps the Rules Committees
drafted a vague or highly discretionary rule with the understanding and
expectation that its meaning should not be fixed but should develop
through case-by-case adjudication or even evolve over time. Allowing
the Rules Committees to explain that situation to the Court—that there is
no consensus Rules Committee view—could lead to more honest rule
interpretation by forcing the Court to justify its interpretation on grounds
other than Committee intent.259
To be sure, institutional modesty is important to maintaining the
Rules Committees’ neutrality and credibility in any amicus practice in
the first place. But neither the appearance of politicization nor the
difficulties of participation justify a blanket prohibition on Rules
Committee participation when it can offer information useful for
effective rule interpretation or application.

256

See, e.g., Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613–19 (1997); Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 397 (1990).
257
See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 196, at 1501 n.30 (suggesting that the Court in
Amchem gave undue weight to Ben Kaplan’s writings, which may not have been
representative of the Committee’s intentions); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory
Procedure in Decline, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 494, 498–99 (1986) (making the general point).
258
Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 609,
672–76 (1990) (pointing out this fact in the context of congressional lawmaking). See also
Shepsle, supra note 253, at 254.
259
Just this Term, in Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, No. 15-457, for example, counsel for
Petitioner, counsel for Respondent, and members of the Court all asserted at oral argument
that the Advisory Committee had varying agendas in mind when it considered and proposed
Rule 23(f). See Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, 18, 28, 35, 40, 56–59, 61, Microsoft Corp.
v. Baker, No. 15-457 (argued Mar. 21, 2017). The Rules Committees could have helped
clarify which one (if any) of the assertions made at oral argument was correct.
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D. Political Objections
The Supreme Court has been portrayed as the primary agent of a
litigation counterrevolution favoring defendants, the government, and
business interests,260 and some might fear that granting an amicus role to
Rules Committees composed of conservative Chief Justice appointees
will continue to fuel the Court’s agenda by, for example, giving the
Court an ostensibly neutral (but actually partisan) cover for its decisions.
That possibility exists, though my proposal to appoint career
Administrative Office attorneys to represent the Rules Committees in
amicus practice should create some distance between the role and any
partisanship of the Chief Justice.261 Because the Chief Justice remains
the head of the judicial branch, some influence is unavoidable, but the
layers of authority and the career status of staff attorneys at the
Administrative Office should provide some insulation from direct
influence by the Chief Justice.
Further, it seems equally possible that Rules Committee participation
will check the ability of the Court (or the Solicitor General) to use
unstudied or cherry-picked arguments to push partisan agendas262—as
the Court arguably did in both Twombly and Dukes. The Federal Judicial
Center, for example, a congressionally created entity whose purpose is
to research and study improvement of judicial administration in federal
courts,263 and which reports to a board rather than directly to the Chief
Justice,264 regularly conducts important and largely nonpartisan studies
260

Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach,
162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1543, 1580, 1613 (2014); Richard Posner et al., How Business Fares in
the Supreme Court, 97 Minn. L. Rev. 1431, 1470–72 (2013); Purcell, supra note 57, at 1742;
Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing
Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 1097, 1107 (2006).
261
See supra text accompanying notes 224–27.
262
See generally Adam M. Samaha, Looking Over A Crowd—Do More Interpretive
Sources Mean More Discretion?, 92 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 554 (2017) (suggesting that the addition
of certain interpretive evidence can constrain, rather than expand, discretion).
263
28 U.S.C. § 620(a) (2012).
264
Id. § 621(a). The Chief Justice is the permanent chairperson of the board, but the
Director of the Administrative Office also is a permanent board member, and the Judicial
Conference elects by vote the other members, who are lower federal judges. Id. A simple
majority vote controls. Id. § 622(b). The Director and Deputy Director of the Federal
Judicial Center serve at the pleasure of the board, but research staff are appointed by the
Director or her delegate. Id. §§ 624(1), 625(b).
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of the rules and their efficacy in the federal courts for the benefit of the
Rules Committees.265 Of course, the Court could press an agenda despite
the views of the Rules Committees or contrary to the studies of the
Federal Judicial Center,266 but there is no reason to think that the Court
is so results oriented and so unconcerned with its institutional legitimacy
that Rules Committee participation could not offer at least some check
on agendas of the Court or its members.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Rules Committees should have, and should take
advantage of, the opportunity to participate in amicus practice before the
Supreme Court. That role would benefit the Court’s rule-interpretation
decision making.
This role has virtues for the Rules Committees as well. Despite the
leadership role in rulemaking given to them by the Rules Enabling Act,
the Rules Committees seem gun-shy about stepping on the Court’s toes.
In two recent class-action amendment packages, for example, the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules abandoned amendment proposals in
part on the ground that the Supreme Court was likely to take up the
issue, or had just recently decided a case on the issue.267 The Advisory
Committee’s response to Twombly and Dukes is similarly suggestive. In
both cases, the Advisory Committee considered amendments to alter the
results in those cases but then declined to pursue them, perhaps in part
because of the unseemliness of overruling the Supreme Court.268
Deference to the Supreme Court is understandable. The Chief Justice
heads the Judicial Conference and appoints members of the Rules

265

See generally Willging, supra note 35 (discussing the Advisory Committee’s use of the
Federal Judicial Center for assistance in examining the current operation of the rules through
empirical research).
266
One narrative of Twombly is that the Court was frustrated with rulemaking inaction in
raising pleading standards and so did so on its own. See generally Hoffman, supra note 63.
267
See Dodson, supra note 27.
268
See Hoffman, supra note 63, at 1512–13, 1529 (questioning why rulemakers have
“effectively acquiesced in the Court’s common law heightening of pleading standards for all
cases” when the rulemakers have consistently rejected proposals to do just that).
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Committees.269 The Supreme Court is the congressionally delegated
body that ultimately approves and prescribes the rules.270 And the Rules
Committees’ members—primarily judges and practitioners—are in the
habit of looking to the Supreme Court as the ultimate authority on the
law.271 These features of the relationship between the rulemakers and the
Court may explain why the Rules Committees shy away from
amendments that are contrary to recent Court rulings.
Amicus participation presents a way for the Rules Committees to be
deferential to the Court while fulfilling a more active role. Amicus
participation recognizes the Court’s primacy in case decision making
and rule interpretation but offers the Rules Committees the opportunity
to influence that decision making by voicing their informed views.
Narrowing the adjudicative separation through a Rules Committee
amicus role gives the Rules Committees the opportunity to help both the
Court and themselves.

269
See About the Judicial Conference, U.S. Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/aboutfederal-courts/governance-judicial-conference/about-judicial-conference [https://perma.cc/
SNS7-9FDL].
270
28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2012).
271
See Scott Dodson, The Gravitational Force of Federal Law, 164 U. Pa. L. Rev. 703,
739 (2016) (“And at the pinnacle of legal prestige is the U.S. Supreme Court, which
commands the utmost gravitas.”).

